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ABSTRACT
The transition to a market economy has sparked Vietnam's unprecedented urbanization
and industrialization. In order to accommodate the spiraling land demand triggered by
urban and economic growth, the Vietnamese government has been using the mechanism
of compulsory acquisition at an astounding scale to convert massive amount of
agricultural land to urban land for non-agricultural uses. A large number of the country's
poorest, most vulnerable citizens have been forced out of their land to make way for
development projects, yet, they are also the group that have least benefited from them.
Compulsory acquisition has therefore been the fundamental cause of social conflicts. The
growing public resistance against compulsory acquisition makes consolidating land the
most difficult step in the housing development process, and one that is frequently beset
with disputes and negotiation impasse, causing significant project delays.
This thesis examines the dynamics behind the site clearance process for the 62-hectare
Van Quan new urban area project, a state-led urban housing development project
conducted by a state-owned developer, the Housing and Urban Development Corporation
(HUD). Given the sizable scale of the project, it is expected that site clearance would be
particularly long and arduous. Yet, HUD was able to complete land acquisition within 6
months. The thesis aims to understand why the Van Quan project had such a rapid site
clearance process despite its scale and complexity. The findings reveal that structural
conditions of the project and developer's own innovativeness were key factors shaping
the auspicious land acquisition outcome. Moreover, contrary to the popular belief that
state developers tend to resort to coercive measures in handling site clearance, HUD was
actually rather accommodating towards farmers' demand. The thesis concludes by
discussing two hypotheses that may explain this seemingly benevolent behavior of HUD
as well as policy implications for implementing site clearance for other projects.
Thesis Supervisor: Annette M. Kim
Title: Ford International Career Development Associate Professor of Urban Studies and
Planning
Thesis Reader: Karl Seidman
Title: Senior Lecturer in Economic Development, Head of Housing and Community
Economic Development
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This is my first effort to write a long research thesis. A number of people have
made this process an intellectually stimulating and truly rewarding learning experience
and I owe a great debt to them.
I would like to sincerely thank my thesis and academic advisor, Professor Annette
Kim. Annette always showed great patience, kindness and gracious support when I was
going through tough times during the process, struggling to find the research questions
and the main arguments. With her prodigious knowledge on the topic and breadth of field
experience in Vietnam, she provided me with valuable guidance and insightful
comments. I'm also grateful for the collegial but critical and nurturing relationship that
we have fostered during the course of my graduate studies at DUSP.
I want to express my gratitude to my reader, Professor Karl Seidman, for his above-
and-beyond effort both inside and outside of the thesis preparation classroom to make
sure that I arrive at a topic and research questions that I deeply care about and come up
with a feasible research plan. Karl also offers valuable perspective on the thesis draft and
helps the final version become more focused and coherent.
I would like to thank my parents whose contribution to this thesis is in no small
measure. They not only did their best to connect me to the staff at HUD as well as
arrange interviews, but also spent time out of their busy schedule to accompany me to the
interview sites to ensure that I was welcomed. I could not have successfully completed
my fieldwork had it not been for their generous support and unconditional love.
Lastly, words of thanks must go out to my husband, who was always there to
provide endless encouragement, critical feedbacks and tremendous help, and my sister
who cheered me up during my moments of frustration. Their constant moral support and
confidence in my research endeavor gave me strength to finish this thesis.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A BSTRA CT ............................................................................................................................................ 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................................................................................... 4
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES .................................................................................................... 7
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 8
I. OVERVIEW ........................................................... ...... ................. 8
II. THE CASE ......................................... .............. .......... ............. 12
III. M ETH O DO LOGY ................................................................................ ..... ................... 16
CHAPTER 1: STRUCTURE OF URBAN GOVERNANCE IN VIETNAM ..................................... 20
I. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN URBAN GOVERNANCE .............................. .............................. 20
1. Land Ownership and Use rights ........................................ .................... 20
2. Housing Regime............................................. .................................. 22
3. Decentralization ......................................... ................. .......... .............. 25
II. PLANNING SYSTEM ............... ......................................................... 27
III. C O N C LU SIO N ....................................................... . ............................................................................ 30
CHAPTER 2: COMPULSORY ACQUISITION IN VIETNAM ..................................... ........ 32
I. COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION AND COMPENSATION................................................ 32
II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF COMPULSORY ACQUISITION IN VIETNAM..................................... 34
III. OFFICIAL RULES GOVERNING LAND ACQUISITION........................... ......................... 37
1. L egal F ram ew ork ........................................................................................................................... 37
2. Principle of Compensation ................................................................................. 40
3. Calculation of Compensation ........................................ ........................ 41
IV. LAND ACQUISITION CONTROVERSIES IN VIETNAM .................................................................. .. 42
1. Land Acquisition and Conflicts ....................... ...................... ......................... 42
2. Principal causes of conflicts ...................................................... ............................ ................ 45
3. Comparison with land-taking controversies in other countries...................................... 53
IV . C O N CLUSIO N ..................................................................................................... ......................... 57
CHAPTER 3: THE ANOMALY - LAND ACQUISITION FOR VAN QUAN ................................. 59
I. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND HOUSING PRODUCTION ........................................................... 59
1. The emergence of state-owned developers ...................................... 59
2. The Development of "New Urban Areas"................................. ................... 61
II. HUD's PROFILE.................................................................................. 65
III. VAN QUAN PROJECT BACKGROUND............................................................................... 66
IV. LAND ACQUISITION FOR VAN QUAN - THE ANOMALOUS OUTCOME ..................................... 69
V . CONCLUSION .................................... .... .... .. ...................................... 71
CHAPTER 4: THE PROCESS OF LAND ACQUISITION FOR VAN QUAN ................................ 73
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE DISPLACED ...................................................... 73
II. PROBLEMS WITH LAND ACQUISITION OR LACK THEREOF ............................................... 74
III. HUD'S STRATEGIES .............. ................................................................................... 77
IV . C O N CLUSIO N ......................................................................................................... 82
CHAPTER 5: EXPLANING HUD'S SUCCESS IN LAND ACQUISITION .................................... 84
I. OVERVIEW OF HYPOTHESIS ............................ ..... .............................................................. 84
1. Strong state pow er.................. . ................................ ........................ ........... .......... 84
2. Profit-Driven Developer.......................................... ............................. 88
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ............................................. 89
III. THE REAL ESTATE MARKET ............................................... 92
IV. STATE AND SOCIETY RELATION ..................................... ................. ............... 96
1. Theories on state-society relation in Vietnam ............................................................ 96
2. Linking theory to HUD's behavior................................... ............ 99
IV . C O N CLU SIO N ..... ......................... ......................................................................................... ....... ..... 103
CONCLUSION ................................................ 105
REFEREN CES ......................................................................................................................................... 110
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
List of Figures
FIGURE 1: FLOOR AREA OF NEWLY BUILT RESIDENTIAL HOUSING IN HANOI ......................................... 24
FIGURE 2: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHARE IN BUDGET EXPENDITURE, 1997 - 2002 .................................... 26
FIGURE 3: URBAN PLANNING SYSTEM IN VIETNAM ........................................................................ 29
FIGURE 4: SITE CLEARANCE PROCEDURE............................... ............. ... ...... ...................... 39
FIGURE 5: LOCATION OF PLANNED AND IMPLEMENTED NEW URBAN AREAS IN HANOI ............................... 63
FIGURE 6: LOCATION OF THE VAN QUAN NEW URBAN AREA ................................................... 67
FIGURE 7: MASTER PLAN OF VAN QUAN PROJECT............................... ....................... 79
List of Tables
TABLE 1: SITE CLEARANCE IN HANOI DURING 2000-2006............................... 36
TABLE 2: KEY PUBLICLY FUNDED PROJECTS BY PURPOSE OF ACQUISITION IN 2006 IN HANOI................ 37
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF PETITION RELATED TO SITE CLEARANCE SUBMITTED TO CITY AUTHORITY ................. 44
TABLE 4: MAJOR STATE-OWNED DEVELOPERS IN HANOI AND Ho CHI MINH CITY (HCMC) ..................... 61
TABLE 5: PRE-DEVELOPMENT LAND USE IN VAN QUAN PROJECT SITE............................................... ... 67
TABLE 6: LAND USE PLANNING FOR VAN QUAN NEW URBAN AREA ............................................... 68
TABLE 7: COMPENSATION RATE FOR VAN QUAN AND CIPUTRA PROJECT.............................. 70
INTRODUCTION
I. Overview
Bold economic reforms of 1986 under the name of Doi moi have ended the
stagnation of central planning and allowed the Vietnamese economy to visibly grow. The
country has ever since recorded an astonishing rate of gross domestic product (GDP)
surge, averaging 7 to 8 percent per year and achieved spectacular success in lifting
millions of its poor population out of extreme poverty (Mundle and Arkadie, 1997, Vu,
2002, Schmidt, 2004). Along side this dynamic transition process from plan to market,
Vietnam is experiencing a structural shift of the economy from a rural to an urban base,
which subsequently triggers unprecedented urbanization. Driven by hopes of jobs and
better standard of living, waves of rural migrants have been populating the cities from the
economically distressed countryside. From a level of 11% in 1950, Vietnam's urban
population has risen to 20% in 2000 (Douglass et al., 2002). Although compared to other
Asian countries, Vietnam is still relatively un-urbanized, the urbanization rate is
projected to reach 30% to 40% by 2010 (Coulhart et al., 2000, Yeung, 2007). It is
estimated that with roughly one million people per year being added to cities, the urban
population will double from 15 million in 1995 to 45 million in 2025 (JBIC, 1999).
In accordance with most regional transition theories, the metropolises of Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City have played leading roles in this economic transformation. These
urban agglomerations not only are targets of large flows of foreign direct investment
(FDI), they also account for a large share of the country's GDP (Waibel, 2004). Hanoi,
for example, contributed 10.2% to total economic output, and attracted 24% of Vietnam's
total FDI in the 2000-2004 period (van Horen, 2005). As a result, these cities have
witnessed a broad array of spatial transformations in their built environment. Roads,
office buildings, houses, apartments, hotels, and industrial parks have sprouted in various
parts of the cities at a pace that exceeds all previous experience. Between 1988 and 1997,
88 multi-storey office buildings were erected in the French Colonial Quarter of Hanoi
(Yeung, 2007), while 837 housing projects were developed within a 5 mile radius from
the city center (Quang and Kammeier, 2002). Since 1986, 202 hotels have been added to
Hanoi's stock of commercial facilities (Quang and Kammeier, 2002). Economic boom
has therefore turned urban land into one of Vietnam's most coveted resources.
The intensification of urban development activities, while necessary for meeting
the demands of economic expansion and housing the swelling urban population,
inevitably entails large-scale loss of farmland in the peri-urban fringe of major
metropolitan areas. Approximately 10,000 hectares of agricultural land have been
converted to urban use annually (Coulhart et al. 2000, Yeung, 2007). In Hanoi, the
agricultural area decreased by 2,123 hectares from 1995 to 2000 for construction and
transportation purposes (Tran et al, 2005). From 2000 to 2006, 1048 urban development
projects in Hanoi necessitated the conversion of 5,699 hectares of rural land and the
resettlement of 153,725 households (Nguyen and Hoang, 2007).
This urban encroachment into rural areas is made possible through the mechanism
of compulsory acquisition, a process by which the state expropriates private property to
assemble land for various public needs while providing the property owner with
compensation (GAO, 2006). Similar to other countries, the Vietnamese government can
exercise the right to take land from private users as long as the benefits of the taking
accrue to the public. Land acquisition has traditionally been used as policy instrument to
rectify market failures in urban development, achieve environmental and social goals, or
help implement land use plans (Ding, 2007). However, over the past decades, it has been
used sparingly for economic development in many countries. In Vietnam, the state, being
the sole owner of all land, has used its taking power at an astounding scale to feed
urbanization and industrialization. In addition, the condition of being a developing
country and the overarching national agenda of economic development have fuelled a
sense of mission that legitimizes massive state requisition of agricultural land to
accommodate profitable residential and commercial development (Kim, 2008).
Compulsory land acquisition can be of great consequence to affected parties.
According to a study by the World Bank, involuntary takings of land can disrupt
community networks, divide roads, irrigation systems, and landholdings, dismantle the
entire production systems and result in the loss of land, assets and income sources for the
displaced households (World Bank, 1996). Thus, depending on the nature and extent of
its use, land acquisition may negatively impact community and individual welfare. The
magnitude of these impacts seems particularly sensitive to compensation policies. In
Western countries where property rights are clearly defined and markets well-developed,
market principles are applied to determine compensation. Affected property owners are
entitled to a payment based on the market value of the subject property together with
other losses suffered by claimant (Chan, 2003). In transitional economies, this principle
of "just" compensation is not yet in place. Assessing a fair market value for
compensation is difficult because plans often involved drastic change in land use and the
methods of land appraisal are often deficient (Han and Vu, 2008, Kim 2008). The
compensation level set by the state often falls significantly below the prevailing market
rate. Land acquisition has therefore become a fundamental source of social conflicts.
Popular protests, sometimes violent, have arisen in these countries as the public began to
perceive and contest the way windfall gains from development projects have not trickled
down to the underprivileged who are relentlessly evicted for an often ill-defined notion of
the greater public good.
A number of scholars have documented a marked upsurge in land-related disputes
in Vietnam since the early 1990s (Gillespie 1998, Nguyen 2007, Kim 2008, Han and Vu,
2008). The rural poor, the very population that is forcibly displaced in the name of
development, are often more impoverished as they become vulnerable economically and
disintegrated socially. The disenchantment with this unequal share of the benefits and
costs of urban development has adversely impacted the progress of urban development
projects and bred increased strain between the authoritarian state and the society over
which it governs.
In face of growing social conflicts, one of the key policy issues in urban
governance is to improve the outcomes of land acquisition for urban development. How
can the site clearance process be made more efficient and less conflict-ridden? What
measures should be adopted to enable more equitable urban development? Most research
on compulsory land acquisition in transitional economies has focused on documenting
how this process has contributed to the proliferation of social conflicts. However, there
has been no study that examines conditions under which efficient land acquisition and
equitable compensation outcomes can be achieved. My thesis research will address this
gap in the literature by examining the dynamics behind a successful case of land
acquisition for a state-led urban housing development project by a state-owed real estate
company. In particular, I seek to study the methods that this developer used to overcome
bottlenecks in land acquisition and understand why the developer would necessarily have
to adopt these strategies despite the fact that it could easily use force to suppress
resistance and evict the hold-outs.
II. The Case
The turbulent nature of compulsory land acquisition in Vietnam means that
consolidating land is often the most difficult step in the housing development process and
one that involves severe tension and substantial conflicts among the parties involved: the
state, the developer and the farmers. The Vietnam's land system is structured such that if
agricultural land is to be converted to residential land for sale, it must undergo a process
of state requisition to be converted to state-owned urban land and reallocated to the
investors, and the current land occupants receive compensation set according to a state-
regulated land price. In the early years of transition, if the land was designated for
residential development in the master plan and the project was approved, government
authorities were often involved in this process, actively helping developers obtain land
use rights from farmers. However, new development in land law has called for a more
diminished role of the government in the land acquisition process and made the local
developers responsible for handling all site clearance and compensation negotiations on
the basis of a state "frame" land price (Han and Vu, 2008). Site clearance and
compensation is a particularly arduous process, especially when projects require the
assembly of many land parcels. It usually takes private developers six months to two
years to complete land acquisition for projects that are two to ten hectares in size. In
many cases, compensation negotiations could stall the projects indefinitely when farmers
don't agree to the proposed price and refuse to relocate (Kim, 2008). According to one
estimate, 80% to 90% of real estate development projects in Hanoi experience significant
delay due to protracted site clearance (Nguyen and Hoang, 2007).
Against this common reality of land negotiation impasse that has plagued many
urban housing development projects, the fact that the Housing and Urban Development
Corporation (HUD), a state-owned real estate company, was able to complete land
acquisition within 6 months for a sizable housing development project - the 62 hectares
Van Quan new urban area - presents an intriguing puzzle. Van Quan is located in the
town of Ha Dong, about 9 km south-west from the center of Hanoi, the capital city of
Vietnam. At the time of development in late 2002, Van Quan lay in the administrative
jurisdiction of Ha Tay province. With the inclusion of neighboring provinces of Ha Tay,
Vinh Phuc and Hoa Binh into the vicinity of Hanoi in 2008, Ha Dong became an urban
district. The construction for Van Quan spans over a three year period from 2002 to 2005.
Upon completion, the project provides various types of housing, including high-rise
apartment complexes, town houses and villas for 14,500 urban residents. In addition to
residential units, Van Quan also offers commercial space for restaurants, shops and other
retail services as well as public facilities such as schools, health centers, parks,
playgrounds and recreational areas. HUD, the developer of Van Quan, is one of
Vietnam's largest state-owned real estate companies headquartered in Hanoi. It is the first
company to engage in the business of developing new residential areas that are over 10
hectares and provide various types of buildings for sale, such as apartments, townhouses,
and villas. HUD invests heavily in housing and multi-use real estate projects in the North,
but recently has ventured to take on many projects in other parts of Vietnam.
Why did Van Quan have such a speedy site clearance process despite the scale
and complexity of the project? At first glance, the sheer fact that this project was
developed by a state-owned real estate company leads one to suspect that the efficiency
in land acquisition was merely because of strong state power. After all, state-owned real
estate firms usually control a large portion of the land designated for residential
development in the city's master plan. Of 44,000 hectares of land in the urban periphery,
RESCO, a city-owned Southern developer, developed 237 projects on 4,382 hectares of
land between 1994 and 2000, and had development control rights for 5000 more hectares
(Kim, 2008). Moreover, the Van Quan project represents a major state-led housing
development effort to increase the housing supply for accommodating the explosive
urban population growth and de-concentrating the urban core areas into pre-existing
urban peripheral villages. Therefore, the developer, backed by the state, could easily
invoke the "public purpose" claim to justify the taking of land for Van Quan and pressure
the residents to accept the terms of compensation and relocate. Lastly, as a business entity
with strong ties to the Ministry of Construction and the police force, HUD is imbued with
great power and legitimacy to enforce the official compensation rates and land
acquisition regulations.
Yet, a number of studies have shown that state-owned enterprises are becoming
more independent from the government in decision-making and increasingly acting as
profit-making entities rather than agents of the government (Pham, 1995, Gainsborough
2002, Vu, 2002). In the case of Van Quan, HUD has to come in close contact with
farmers during the land compensation negotiation process. Thus, in conducting land
acquisition, it might find itself having to mediate between its desire to adhere to
government regulations and farmers' demand for better compensation. Moreover, as a
for-profit entity established to capture the enormous profits from the booming real estate
market, even though HUD is supported by the state, it still has to find practical ways to
avoid any conflicts or disputes that would impede the project's progress. This tension
between public ownership and the firm's profit-maximizing behavior makes Van Quan
an interesting and revealing case to study site clearance and compensation.
This thesis, then, explores how HUD achieved success in negotiating land
acquisition for Van Quan when this process has usually slowed or halted other similar
projects. Given that there has been relatively little published research on the phenomenon
of land acquisition in the context of Vietnam, this research will add insights to the
existing literature on urban political economy in Vietnam. The research also has an
important policy implication. If we can understand how one developer succeeded in
surmounting problems with site clearance, we can encourage conditions that may
facilitate the implementation of land acquisition for other projects and improve the
outcome of this most difficult step in the urban development process.
The findings reveal that the site clearance process was indeed free of conflicts
because HUD actually went the extra mile to adopt facilitative measures that would
directly address farmers' complaints, instead of resorting to coercive measures to deal
with the difficulties in site clearance, as often seen in other cases of land acquisition in
authoritarian regimes where the state has the hegemonic power to quell farmers' protests
and force them to relocate. Such measures include increasing monetary support for job
resettlement, employing local officials to handle compensation negotiation, ensuring a
transparent and democratic site clearance process, and even altering the project plan if it
became too difficult to acquire all parcels. In addition to HUD's own innovative
strategies, there were also structural conditions specific to the project that helped
facilitate the process, such as the full titling of agricultural land and effective land
management practices in the locality. The thesis also discusses two factors that could
possibly explain the relatively benevolent behavior of HUD: the prevailing real estate
market conditions at the time of Van Quan's development, which impose huge pressures
for fast development and the nature of state and society relation in Vietnam which allows
acts of resistance by farmers to gradually change the way business is conducted by the
developer and improve land acquisition outcomes.
III. Methodology
The bulk of this research is based on one month of fieldwork in Hanoi, Vietnam
in January of 2009. But this research is also complemented and informed by two
additional trips I made to Vietnam during 2008. In January 2008, I spent time commuting
to the western edge of Hanoi and visiting the so-called "new urban areas", essentially
middle-class residential enclaves created by state-owned real-estate companies like HUD.
Modern houses and high-rise apartments springing from formerly rice paddy fields have
engendered a wholesale transformation of this part of the city. Viewing these drastic
changes in the urban physical environment, I began to wonder about the fate of the
vulnerable farmers over the course of economic development and their rights to land and
livelihood, and became interested in the topic of compulsory land acquisition for urban
development. I approached key informants to gather general information about the
purpose and extent of this phenomenon in Hanoi. In the summer of 2008, I spent three
month in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam to intern for the Urban Environmental Planning
Program. Over the course of the internship, I had the opportunity to interact significantly
the lecturers at the Ho Chi Minh Architecture University as well as international experts
who had conducted research on key planning issues in Vietnam. These informants also
offered substantial insights on the topic. In the fall of 2008, I learned about the Van Quan
project and its successful land acquisition process through my parents' contact at HUD
and decided to investigate this case further.
Before conducting my fieldwork, in order to understand the nature and evolution
of land acquisition controversies in Vietnam, I examined news articles pertaining to
compensation and resettlement published during the 8-year period between January 1,
2000 and December 31, 2008 from four Vietnamese newspapers: Ha Noi Moi, Lao Dong,
Tuoi Tre and Vietnamnet (an electronic newspaper). These newspapers are chosen
because they have long been considered as the most influential newspapers in Vietnam
due to their extensive readership and large circulation. In addition, these newspapers also
represent a range of political affiliation. Ha Noi Moi is the voice of the Communist Party,
Lao Dong belongs to the Workers' Union, and Tuoi Tre is the voice of the Youth Union.
Resettlement, compensation, land acquisition, land conversion were used as keywords to
search the newspaper archives. I only skimmed the factual news briefs and focused on
analyzing editorial pieces to investigate the problems with compensation and resettlement
that have adversely impacted the progress of urban development projects in Hanoi. As I
reviewed these articles, I attempted to develop categories to classify the problems, as well
as assessing how the news coverage of these problems changed over time.
During the month-long fieldwork in January 2009, I conducted in-depth, on site,
semi-structured interviews with three members of the site clearance team for Van Quan,
the director of the Management Committee for Van Quan, the director of the design
division of HUD. During these interviews, I first asked the respondents general questions
about the structure of HUD, the number and type of projects in HUD's portfolio, the
history of the Van Quan project, its location, size, and timing. I then began asking more
detailed questions about the land acquisition process for Van Quan to uncover how HUD
implemented site clearance, the challenges that HUD faced during this process for Van
Quan and other projects and the strategies HUD adopted to overcome them to move the
project forward. I also asked whether or not the problems with site clearance that I had
previously identified through the analysis of Vietnamese journalistic accounts existed in
the land acquisition process for Van Quan. Lastly, I asked them about the factors that
they considered most important in making site clearance successful
In addition, I also met with two officials of Ha Dong district, a junior staff at the
Center for Land Fund Development of Tu Liem District, and a professor at the Hanoi
Architecture University who advised HUD in the past with site clearance for another
project to get a more nuanced view on the developer and the land acquisition process in
Hanoi. Apart from these interviews, I also toured the project site and visited the project's
sale office. While in the field, I collected print materials related to the project, including
site plan, advertising materials, compensation plan, financing plan and articles about the
project and the developer. These documents contain valuable information on the project
and the socio-economic circumstances of affected households. I also collected land laws
and various decrees related to land acquisition and compensation to examine how land
acquisition is structured by the state and how official policies guiding this process have
evolved over time.
Because of the time constraints and the difficulty and risk associating with
interviewing households in a constrained political environment, one limitation of the
research is that I was not able to interview any residents that were affected by the project.
Therefore, I could only make interpretations based on the developer's view and key
informants' observation of the project, but this might not be representative of the
residents' perspective.
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the institutional
context that structures Vietnam's urban planning system. The first section delineates key
policy changes since economic reforms that affect urban development and the second
section sketches the administrative framework that manages the urban sector. Chapter 2
focuses on the land acquisition process in Vietnam, highlighting important legal aspects
of land acquisition and compensation, discussing the current controversies over land-
takings in Vietnam and comparing them with taking controversies in other countries.
Chapter 3 presents a detailed account of the developer and the Van Quan project and the
anomalous nature of land acquisition for Van Quan. Chapter 4 delves into process of land
acquisition for Van Quan, and describes the problems with the site clearance process and
strategies that HUD adopts to overcome them. Chapter 5 discusses two factors that may
possibly explain HUD's success in acquiring land for Van Quan: the real estate market
and the nature of state and society relations in Vietnam.
CHAPTER 1
Structure of Urban Governance in Vietnam
I. Institutional Change in Urban Governance
During the 1954-1985 period, Vietnam adopted its own version of a Soviet-style
centrally planned economy. Under this regime, only state ownership of land was allowed,
household consumption was administratively controlled and resources were channeled to
develop heavy industries for rapid industrialization, a high priority task on the national
development agenda (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996). In 1986, the country embarked on a
radical reform aptly characterized by the term Doi Moi (Renovation) to respond to the
dire economic realities of the 1980s. The implementation of Doi Moi has rendered
profound changes in the Vietnam's economy and society. The centrally controlled
planning model has been replaced by the market-oriented model where the free market
has increasingly become the main mechanism for resource allocation. The previous
absolute domination of the State was replaced by the diversification of ownership,
enabling non-state ownership forms such as private and joint-venture (Tran et al., 2005)
and the inclusion of multiple actors in the economic decision-making process: the party,
the state, state-owned enterprises, private firms, foreign firms and individuals (Han and
Vu, 2008). Against the backdrop of an evolving open market economy, the government
has introduced various policy reforms that have significantly impacted the urban sector.
1. Land Ownership and Use rights
Prior to 1986, under the socialist system of planned economy, the state brought all
privately owned farmland into cooperative ownership for collective agricultural
production. Embracing the Marxist principle of public ownership, the 1980 constitution
stipulated that the State, as the representative of the people, had full ownership of all land
in the country. Thus, no private rights in land were allowed and private land transactions
were strictly prohibited. The central planning system allocated urban land plots to users
(usually state employees or state organizations) through administrative channels which
did not charge users for land occupation, except for a small use fees. Urban land was
virtually a free good (Quang and Kammeier, 2002). In the early 1980s, Vietnam started to
de-collectivize the agricultural system and revitalize household-based private production.
With the introduction of Doi moi, the State enacted a land law in 1988 affirming state
ownership of all land but permitting the grant of land use rights to individuals and
organizations. However, household's ability to transfer land use-rights was extremely
restricted under this legislation. The subsequent Land Law of 1993 recognized five
additional rights over land for users, including the right for long-term use, transfer,
mortgage, lease, and inheritance. The 2003 Land Law expanded the users' rights further
by granting rights to use land as a collateral or capital input in business, and to claim for
compensation when land is recovered by the State (Han and Vu, 2008).
The widespread adoption of the land use rights system has multiple impacts. First,
it promotes the development of a market for land use rights, enabling market mechanisms
to affect land use and land allocation decisions. This, in turn, catalyzes a huge surge in
real estate development activities that has fundamentally transformed the spatial order of
many cities. Second, it creates an institutional capacity for local governments to raise
much-needed revenues to finance public projects. Since the state retains ownership of all
land, investors in commercial projects are required to pay upfront leasing fees for a 50
year period. Third, it sets the basis for land titling program which grants individuals or
firms land use certificates. In 1994, the government mandated the issuance of "pink
certificate" to urban households and 'red certificate' to rural households. The pink
certificate combines home ownership and land use rights into one document while the
"red certificate" confirms the ownership of land use rights in non-urban areas (Kim,
2004). It is important to note, however, that the land titling process has proceeded
unevenly. In 2000, 85% agricultural land appeared to have been titled, but only 25% of
urban households had received land use certificates (Dang and Palmkvist, 2001, Hare,
2008). Low conversion from un-tilted to titled land use rights in urban areas can be
attributed to many reasons, such as the lack of legal papers to document tenancy status,
unresolved property disputes, incomplete cadastral mapping, fees and time associated
with the complicated application process and the tax liabilities incurred with ownership
(AusAid, 1999, Kim, 2004). In spite of the backlog in distributing land certificates, the
possession of the land use right certificate is still a meaningful form of property right.
Kim (2004) found that the pink certificate, though not the most valuable form of property
right, nonetheless confers significant positive impact on the market value of urban real
estate in Ho Chi Minh City. In addition, it also created a situation in which a dearth of
titled urban land and housing coexisted with the abundance of titled agricultural land.
2. Housing Regime
Before the economic reform was introduced, housing production in Vietnam was
monopolized by the state and private construction was severely restricted. The state had
its own housing construction agency to build collective living quarters (khu tap the) with
two-to five-storey apartment buildings based on the Soviet model. State-produced
housing was then allocated almost exclusively to state employees at very low rent which
was not sufficient to cover the maintenance costs (Trinh and Nguyen, 2001). The part of
the population who did not work in state agencies was excluded from housing provision.
Due to the state funding shortfall and repression of private builders (Koh, 2004), housing
supply failed to meet housing demand, leading to extensive shortages in the city. In the
late 1980s, and early 1990s, it is estimated that only 30% of government employees,
mainly those in Northern cities, received housing from the state, while the remaining
70% had to resort to their own means to solve the accommodation need (Yip and Tran,
2008). Between 1954 and 1990, the average living area per person in Hanoi declined
from 6.7 square meters to 4 square meters per capita (Quang and Keimmier, 2002).
Housing reform began in 1986 with a gradual withdrawal of the state from its
subsidized housing policy and individuals and firms increasingly assuming the
responsibility of housing production. The state shifted from being a direct provider and
financier to a market player and enabler, adopting policies and measures to encourage
private sector production. Such measures included the lifting of the ban on self-help
building activity at the end of 1980s, the termination of physical provision of housing to
state employees in 1992 and 1993, the increase of state-owned housing rent (in some
cases up to 54 times), the establishment of legal basis for land and housing ownership and
transactions and the commercialization of the building materials industry. Another bold
move in housing reform was the privatization of state-owned housing in 1994 to allow
tenants to buy their dwellings from the state (Yip and Tran, 2008). New owners would
now bear the costs of maintenance and repair as well as the management of their
privately owned property.
The removal of controls on individual households together with a dramatic
increase in private capital formation has stimulated a real estate boom in many cities.
Figure 1 shows the number of floor area of newly built residential housing in Hanoi from
1990 to 1997 by source of funding. While the number of floor area funded by the central
government decreased from 28.3% in 1990 to 3.3% in 1997, the number funded by
households dramatically increased from 1.4% in 1990 to almost 80% in 1997 (Tran et al.,
2005). Also in Hanoi, the annual increase of floor areas was from 300,000 to 400,000
square meters in the early 2000s. By 2003, this number jumped to more than one million
square meters (Yip and Tran, 2008).
Figure 1: Floor area of newly built residential housing in Hanoi
* Ctl1govemmunat Lcal Govrmn wkb cmnta fiids
D InalOW rnMat a se uth by M iciztal
SJoin ventua & oathr cowumirl Othr
Source: Tran et al. (2005)
Housing production was further boosted in the late 1990s by a series of directives
to give tax breaks and favorable land lease schemes to spur investments by developers
(Yip and Tran, 2008). As a result, state-owned housing companies and foreign developers
began to construct housing projects under state control and management. Private
developers also emerged to be an important player in the housing market, despite facing
many institutional constraints created by the state in conducting business (Kim, 2008).
These business entities mobilized capital from a variety of sources to finance their
projects including their own budget, loans from state banks, and most importantly
installment payments from customers at different stages of the projects' completion.
Thus, a market-oriented model of housing production began to evolve.
The liberalization of the socialist housing regime has resolved, at least
temporarily, the housing shortage crisis. Yet, many serious housing problems persist,
posing mounting challenges for urban planners. Per-capita floor space is still extremely
low due to population growth and increasing demand. According to a Ministry of
Construction report, 30 percent of the people in Hanoi have less than 3 square meters per
person. In Ho Chi Minh City, there are 150,000 temporary dwellings and 24,000 slum
dwellings along the city's canals and small rivers (Trinh and Nguyen, 2001). Rapid and
uncontrolled housing construction has resulted in ample illegal construction and land
occupation, destroying the urban landscape of many Vietnamese cities. Other key
consequences of this spontaneous construction boom include the gradual loss of the
historic/green area, the overload of the dilapidated urban infrastructure, speculation in
land and house prices, and heavy traffic congestion in dense urban areas.
3. Decentralization
Driven by changes unleashed by economic reforms since the late 1980s, Vietnam
has embarked on an extensive decentralization program to transfer greater administrative
and fiscal responsibilities to local government. Two landmark pieces of legislation, the
1996 State Budget Law and the 2002 State Budget Law gave provincial governments the
authority to raise their own revenue and spend an increasing share of the state budget
(Fritzen, 2006). From 1992 to 2002, the share of local governments in total expenditures
increased substantially from 26% to 48% (Coulhart et al., 2002), while the shares of
central government expenditures in health, education and agricultural sectors declined
steeply (see Figure 3). This positioned in Vietnam amongst some of the most highly
decentralized countries in the world, on par with federal countries such as the United
States and India.
Figure 2: Central Government Share in Budget Expenditure, 1997 - 2002
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Together with the growing level of fiscal decentralization, the government has
been transferring increasing responsibilities to lower administrative levels. The 2003
Land Law delegates responsibilities of land allocation, titling, land administration, land  , ,  i i tr ti , l
registry, and the creation of formal real estate markets to the local governments. The new
Construction Law decentralizes the preparation of spatial plans for most cities and
provinces as well as the authority to approve high-capital investment projects to the
Peoples' Committees at the city level (Coulthart et al., 2006). Some city planning
authority is also decentralized to the districts. Districts' governments have been making
their own detailed master plan based on the city's general master plan, and practicing
great discretion in determining the land use of specific sites (Kim, 2008)
II. Planning System
The official recognition and promotion of market forces have enabled the
planning system in Vietnam to evolve from a highly prescriptive model based on central
control to a more flexible and adaptable system with considerable delegation of authority
to local governments. The planning system in Vietnam is comprised of three main
instruments: socio-economic development plan (policy and strategy); spatial plan (giving
spatial orientation to the investment decisions), and sector development plan. Spatial
plans are prepared in four levels of detail: orientation plans (national policy), regional
plans (introduced in 2005), master plans (province or city), and detailed area plans (ward,
industrial zone, or project). Master plans are prepared for a period of 15-20 years, with
updates every five years. They determine the location of future residential development
and other land uses in the city. Detailed plans are drawn at a scale of 1/500 - 1/2000 to
determine specific uses of the urban space within in a city (such as residential uses,
location of future roads and industrial centers) in accordance with the master plan
(Coulthart et al., 2006). The preparation of detailed plan is normally the first step in
pursuing an urban development project and is a prerequisite for obtaining the planning
certificate, land allocation construction approval (JBIC, 1999).
The urban administration is structured in a hierarchical order, extending
continuously from the Central government to the household level. In terms of
administrative responsibility, while the government is responsible for the laws and
legislations that make up the urban and housing policy and provision of policy guidance,
central agencies have significant powers in coordinating urbanization. The Ministry of
Planning and Investment assumes the leading role in consulting with the government and
the Party and ultimately producing the socio-economic development plan. The Ministry
of Construction is the primary agency in charge of housing and urban development and
prepares the master plan (construction plan) for the urban system. The land use plans are
formulated by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (see Figure 2). Most
entities with planning responsibility at the city and district level have a dual reporting
relationship, a vertical relationship to the central ministries and a horizontal relationship
to the Peoples' Committees. For example, in Hanoi, the Department of Natural Resources
Environment and Housing Administration, charged with the administration of land,
natural resources and housing development, has to be accountable to both ministries and
to the People's Committee of Hanoi. A similar dual command structure - vertically to the
municipal department and horizontally to the Ward People's committee, is also observed
at the ward level (Yip and Tran, 2008).
Although the system appears to be centralized, there is flexibility at the lower
levels. The People's Committees at the city level have certain degree of autonomy to
perform urban planning and development and administrate the local government. The
Districts also have their own People's Committee and certain independence from the city
in planning and implementing programs. They have their own budget, they can deliver
some building permits, and they have their own construction companies, which often act
as developers. The wards do not have their own budget but they work closely with the
local police and organize social services (Coit, 1998).
Figure 3: Urban Planning System in Vietnam
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Despite increased devolution of decision-making, planning in Vietnam remains a
top-down process beset by complexity and redundancy. Most important planning
decisions are made at the central government level without effective cross-sector
consultation and public discussion. Furthermore, spatial planning does not always follow
socio-economic plans and sector plans. This lack of coordination in sequencing is
exacerbated by the fact that the planning institutes tend to overlook economic and social
dimensions, while the socio-economic planners seem to overlook the spatial and
environmental implications of investment projects. The poor linkage between
socioeconomic and spatial planning is also manifested in the overlapping responsibilities
of central and local agencies. Investment projects, for example, require up to fourteen
separate official approvals, which can take up to one year to obtain (Coulthart et al.,
2006). As the state's urban management experience and capacity is extremely limited and
unprepared for the sweeping transformation of many cities, informal patterns of urban
development have emerged due to unauthorized land transfers and illegal construction.
Many of the residential areas in Vietnam's cities have been developing on an ad-hoc
basis, resulting in tightly packed urban settlements without properly functioning drainage
or sewerage systems, or open spaces for recreation (Coulthart et al., 2006). In addition,
the plans are usually prepared by planning experts and city administrators without taking
into account public inputs, and are not easily accessible to the general public. Thus, the
individuals or firms who have the right political connections to obtain insider information
and make informed guesses about the government plans for infrastructure development
and land use can make potentially huge windfall profits. The uncertainties in the
government's plan also fuel speculative actions in the estate market.
III. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that the transition to a market-oriented economy in
Vietnam has led to simultaneous changes in the institutional structure of urban
governance. With the provision of use rights to land users, land has become a commodity
with value and subject to market transactions. The housing sector has also been
commercialized to a great extent. The state abandoned its role as a sole producer and
distributor of housing for urban residents and encouraged private sector participation in
housing provision. The result has been the increased amount of housing produced and
increased diversity of housing producers. The state also vigorously pursued
decentralization to give the local government greater autonomy both administratively and
fiscally. Despite fundamental structural changes that have occurred in the wake of
reforms, the planning system still resembles the past's top-down model, and is therefore
unable to respond to the much more liberal economic setting, where the market have
become the overshadowing force that shapes urban development processes.
These characteristics of the urban governance structure have important
implications for the land acquisition and housing development process in Vietnam. In the
next chapter, I will review the institutional framework that structures land acquisition in
Vietnam and discuss the main causes of controversies surrounding land acquisition, while
putting them into comparative light with controversies in other countries.
CHAPTER 2
Compulsory Land Acquisition in Vietnam
I. Compulsory Land Acquisition and Compensation
In the property rights literature, the protection of private property rights plays a
vital role in a market economy because it allows property owners to control their
property, and therefore benefit from its use, sale or value. However, in many parts of the
world, the governments has the inherent constitutional or legal rights to compulsorily
acquire private property for public uses while paying "just" compensation to those whose
property has been taken (GAO, 2005). This right is often referred to as "eminent
domain", "expropriation", "taking" or "compulsory acquisition" in Western countries
(Chan, 2003). In theory, as long as the benefits in the change of land use (and land users)
accrue to the larger public, the taking of private property is justified on utilitarian ground.
The property rights of the few could be forced to defer to the benefit of the majority
(Kim, 2009).
Compulsory land acquisition has commonly been used as policy instrument to
rectify market failures in urban development (such as situations of blight and land
monopoly, and provision of public infrastructure) or to achieve environmental and social
goals (Ding, 2007). Yet, over the past decades, it has also been used sparingly for
economic development against the threat of potential "holdout" owners seeking above the
market compensation rates. In the U.S., for example, state and local authorities have
invoked "eminent domain" power to acquire properties located within distressed
municipalities and transfer them to private entities for economic revitalization purpose,
even though the properties themselves are not blighted (Keating, 2007). In developing
countries, due to the demands of economic expansion and the overarching agenda of
economic development, state planners have also employed this mechanism at astounding
scales to feed urbanization and industrialization (Kim, 2009). Massive amount of land has
been requisitioned by the state to fuel private residential and commercial development.
Compulsory land acquisition often has far-reaching and long-lasting socio-
economic impact on the lives of dispossessed. According to a study by the World Bank,
involuntary takings of land can disrupt community networks, divide roads, irrigation
systems, and landholdings, dismantle the entire production systems and result in the loss
of land, assets and income sources for the displaced households (World Bank, 1996).
Syagga and Olima (1996) surveyed the households who were displaced by the Nairobi
Water Supply project in Kenya and found that the project had caused them a considerable
amount of suffering in terms of income, family composition, cultural network and social
support. In addition, the indirect impacts of compulsory land acquisition may also be
substantial, depending on the purpose of acquisition. There is a wide variation of
environmental, socio-economic and fiscal impacts associated with different uses such as
open space, development of parks, construction of pipelines, highways and water projects
and establishment of industrial zones (Ding, 2007).
In a market economy, the acquisition of private property is governed by the
market law of supply and demand as well as government-enacted laws and regulations.
The existing property owner voluntarily transfers the legal titles and deeds of the property
to the buyer at a price that is mutually agreed between the two parties (Han and Vu,
2008). Yet, when the government uses its taking power to acquire land for public
purposes, the property owner will be forced to give up his/her property rights and receive
compensation set according to legal guidelines. Compensation is therefore the most
important aspect of any taking action. In Western countries where property rights are
clearly defined and markets well-developed, there exists a "just compensation" principle
to ensure that the dispossessed are compensated adequately. In the U.S, affected property
owners are entitled to a payment based on the market value of the subject property, which
is the best offering price in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer. In the
U.K, compensation is based on the principle of value to the owner, consisting of market
value together with other losses suffered by claimant (Chan, 2003). In transitional
economies, this principle of "just" compensation is not yet in place. Assessing a fair
market value for compensation is difficult because plans often involve drastic change in
land use, resulting in considerable land and housing peculation and the methods of land
appraisal are often undeveloped (Han and Vu, 2008, Kim 2009). In addition, since the
state owns all land, in legal theory, it has no market value. Instead, the government enacts
statutory pricing formula for calculating land values and determining compensation in
cases of compulsory acquisition for public purposes. Compensation level in these
countries therefore falls significantly below the prevailing market rate. The way that
compensation is determined and distributed has given rise to substantial social conflicts.
II. Nature and Extent of Compulsory Acquisition in Vietnam
As discussed in the previous chapter, Vietnam has been undergoing profound
socioeconomic transformation ushered in by wide-ranging economic reforms that
effectively began in 1986, and the interrelated forces of economic growth and policy
reforms have sparked Vietnam's record rate of urbanization. The urban population was
20% in 2000, but increased to 26% in 2006, and is forecasted to grow to 33% to 45% by
2020 (Yeung, 2007). Rapid urban growth has triggered spiraling demand for land to
support a plethora of urban and economic development activities, ranging from
infrastructure, urban renewal, housing and offices to industrial zones. This has propelled
the government to convert large tracts of agricultural land into urban land for non-
agricultural uses. It is estimated that over 10,000 hectares of agricultural land in Vietnam
are being converted to urban land annually (Coulthart et al., 2006). On average, Hanoi
loses 1,000 ha of agricultural land every year (Nguyen and Hoang, 2007).
Vietnam's land system is structured such that the state has ultimate ownership
right over all land but allocates the rights to occupy and use it to the people for a certain
period of time or long term, depending on the type of land. For residential land, the
period of allocation extends to perpetuity. Agricultural land is distributed to farmers with
a 20-year tenure for cultivating annual crops and a 50-year tenure for cultivating
perennial crops. By possessing land use rights, the farmers can directly control and use
the land, enjoy the product of land use, and dispose of the land according to the new Land
Law. However, as farmland is designated for agricultural use, it cannot be used for non-
agricultural purposes. If agricultural land is to be converted for other uses, it must
undergo a process of state requisition to be returned to the state and reassigned to new
land users. The current farmers will be compensated according to the state-regulated
agricultural land price. They do not have the right to decide on compensation prices for
the land use rights other economic rights embedded in the land they have lost.
Compulsory land acquisition has been a fundamental process in Vietnam's rural-
to-urban transition. Table 1 indicates that from 2000 to 2006, there were a total of 2,427
projects that required land acquisition in Hanoi. Out of these projects, 1,048 had
completed site clearance and transferred land to the investors. Roughly 80% of the
requisitioned land is agricultural land in the suburban communes or new urban district at
the fringe of the city (Nguyen and Hoang, 2007).
Table 1: Site clearance in Hanoi during 2000-2006
Number of Number of households
Projects Land area (ha) receiving compensation
Projects Total amount
with Total area of Number of
completed Total area of Total compensation households
site of successful Number of (in million receiving
Year Total clearance requisition clearance households VND) resettlement
2000 139 64 854 349 11,450 43,800 921
2001 351 159 1,475 733 22,662 768,126 1,602
2002 417 194 2,863 1,003 27,767 930,530 969
2003 429 214 2,656 1,415 30,037 1,736,445 1,873
2004 417 161 2,814 875 20,889 1,551,248 1,212
2005 374 184 2,340 927 28,718 2,769,826 2,170
7 months
of 2006 300 72 1,524 397 12,202 1,926,534 1,833
Total 2,427 1,048 14,526 5,699 153,725 9,726,509 10,580
Source: Nguyen and Hoang (2007)
Compulsory acquisition has been used an effective tool to supply land for urban
development in Hanoi. As shown in Table 2, during the first seven months of 2006, the
land acquired for basic infrastructure and transportation-related projects such as, building
roads and bridges, expansion of highways, and construction of new public offices
represent the highest of percentage (39%) all acquisitions. Auctioning land use rights to
potential investors was also another purpose for which compulsory acquisition was
frequently invoked.
In addition to providing land for public work projects, land acquisition is also
necessary for the development of housing and commercial space in peri-urban areas.
Since 1998, mixed residential and commercial projects have been undertaken by state-
owned, private and foreign developers. Six new urban areas with size of more than 30
hectares have emerged in Hanoi together with a few golf courses. These projects require
an enormous amount of agricultural land to be converted to urban use in order for
development to proceed.
Table 2: Key publicly funded projects by purpose of acquisition in 2006 in Hanoi*
Number of
Purpose of Acquisition Projects Percent
Infrastructure and public transportation 12 39%
Wastewater treatment surrounding West Lake 2 6%
Drainage system 1 3%
Industrial zones 2 6%
Public parks 3 10%
Handicraft village 1 3%
Memorial sites 1 3%
Resettlement Housing 4 13%
Land use right auction 5 16%
Total 31 100%
*Tabulated based on data from Nguyen and Hoang (2007)
III. Official Rules Governing Land Acquisition
1. Legal Framework
The 1993 and 2003 Vietnam Land Law set the stage for compulsory land
acquisition by stipulating that the state may lawfully requisition land from organizations,
households or persons, when such land is needed for national defense, security, and
public interest purpose. The public interest is defined broadly, consisting of construction
of public infrastructure (transportation lines, bridges, pavements, water supply and
drainage, dykes, dams, schools, hospitals, public parks, etc.), building of work places for
state agencies and state political and social organizations, industrial parks, high-tech
parks, entertainment and recreation centers, and other investment projects licensed by the
government, development of new urban areas and residential areas, and construction of
public or non-profit facilities for local authorities.
The process of compulsory acquisition in the period of 1994-1998 was guided by
Decree 90/CP issued on August 17, 1994, following the enactment of the 1993 Land
Law. However, as this decree failed to keep pace with the rapid urban change and rising
problems related to compensation in the early 1990s, it was succeeded by Decree
22/1998/ND-CP issued on April 24, 1998. Compared to Decree 90/CP, Decree 22 offers
relatively more detailed provisions on compensation and resettlement. Particularly, it
requires the People's Committee of the city to instruct the districts under its direct control
to set up a Compensation and Site Clearance Council for each project. The Council is
headed by the President of the People's Committee of the district and has representatives
from the local government, project owner (land user), the Fatherland Front, and the
Department of Finance and Market and Prices, and the affected residents. The Council is
in charge of formulating and evaluating the compensation plan and organizing site
clearance according to the ratified plan. However, the decree also allows the project
owners to negotiate compensation directly with the persons whose land is recovered in
accordance the provisions of this Decree. The establishment of the Council in these cases
is not necessary. Nevertheless, the investor will have to submit the plan of compensation
to the People's Committee of the district for approval before implementation.
Figure 4: Site Clearance Procedure
Step 1 Order of Land Acauisition is issued
Step 2 PPC sets up Council of Compensation and Site Clearance(CCSC) at the District level
CCSC conducts survey on Project-Affected Households
Step 3- Step 7 and verify land and assets information
Step 8 CCSC submits proposed compensation plan to Appraisal
Council or President of PPC
Step 9 President of PPC approves or denies Compensation Plan
Step 10 Site Clearance and compensation plan is implemented
Step 1: After the project is approved, an order on land acquisition is issued by competent authority and
submitted to the President of the provincial-level People's Committee (PPC).
Step 2: The President of the PPC shall instruct the relevant agencies to set up the Council of Compensation
and Site Clearance (CCSC).
Step 3: The CCSC shall conduct survey on lands and assets in the project area in order to prepare the
compensation plan.
Step 4: Project-affected persons (PAPs) shall fill in survey questionnaires to declare information on their
affected land and assets and send the forms to the People's Committee at the commune or ward level.
Step 5: People's Committee at the commune or ward level shall confirm these questionnaires, and send
them to the CCSC at the district level.
Step 6: The CCSC shall conduct investigation of the land and assets to verify the questionnaire results,
with the participation of the project-affected households and the project owner.
Step 7: The CCSC shall make determination on the total amount of compensation for the land and
properties existing on the land, and other monetary support and allowances, and formulate the proposed
compensation plan to integrate all these factors.
Step 8: The CCSC shall submit the proposed compensation plan to a) the Appraisal Council at the city
level (if the CCSC is set up at the district level) or b) The president of the People's Committee of the city
(if CCSC is set up at the city level).
Step 9: The Appraisal Council shall appraise the Compensation Program submitted by CCSC and report to
President of PPC. Based on the report submitted by the Appraisal Council, the President of PPC shall
approve or reject the Compensation program.
Step 10: If approved, the project owner shall carry out site clearance and compensation plan, paying
compensation and allowances, or providing resettlement to the PAPs.
Decree 197/2004/ND-CP, promulgated after the 2003 Land Law, de-emphasizes
this direct involvement of the government in site clearance. Under this decree, the city
and district authorities no longer set up the compensation and site clearance council for
projects that are not funded by the state budget or foreign investment. All site clearance
tasks are now the responsibilities of the local investors. This implies that to assemble land
for residential and commercial development projects, the developers will have to handle
all compensation negotiations with the land occupants on the basis of the government
price framework without the facilitation of district or city governments.
Figure 4 shows the detailed procedures of land acquisition as stipulated by Decree
22. With the issuance of decree 197, Step 2 is no longer applicable to non-publicly-
funded projects. The investors will have to complete Step 3 through Step 10 in the
absence of support from the district government.
2. Principle of Compensation
When the state requisitions land in the public interest, the general principle is that
compensation is payable according to the original use of the acquired land. It cannot be
made according to the value of land set for the new purpose. Compensation consists of
three main components: i) compensation for the land area that is recovered, ii)
compensation for existing assets on the land, and iii) monetary support for relocation,
life stabilization, job change training and other assistance to the persons whose land is
expropriated.
Depending on each case, compensation can take the form of cash, land or
resettlement housing equal to the value of land use right at the time the requisition
decision is issued. When compensation in land or resettlement housing involves
difference in area or value from that of the recovered land, such difference will be paid in
cash. If current land users have not yet fulfilled their land-related financial obligations
towards the State, any amount they owe will be subtracted from the compensation and
support money for payment to the state budget.
Compensation is only paid to the persons whose land is requisitioned if they valid
documents to prove that they are the legal users of land, and if the expropriated land is
free from disputes. Organizations and individuals who are allocated or leased the
requisitioned land are responsible for paying compensation for the current land
occupants.
3. Calculation of Compensation
According to various decrees guiding the implementation of land acquisition
pursuant to the 1993 Land Law, the land price for compensation calculation is determined
by multiplying the state-regulated local land price with a coefficient K. The K coefficient
varies by projects and is determined at the discretion of the President of the People's
Committee of the province or city in consultation with the Department of Finance and
Market Price and other related agencies. According to Decree 87/CP, this K coefficient
can range from 0.8 to 1.2. The local land price is determined by the People's Committee
of the city or province in accordance with the price frames set by the central government
for different land categories. It serves as the basis for calculating taxes on assignment of
land-use rights, fees on land assignment, land rents, and compensating for losses incurred
by land requisition. However, since this statutory value of land is invariably much lower
than the market value, the local authority is authorized to determine compensation in
conjunction with the K coefficient to ensure that the compensation land price is on par
with the market land price in each locality.
The 2003 Land Law integrates and fine-tunes various compensation decrees and
abolishes this dual land price system. Decree 188/ND-CP pursuant to the 2003 Land Law
introduces two methods of land valuation: the income-based method and the direct
comparison method. The income-based method determines the price based on the
productivity of land, which is the annual net income earned on land discounted by the
annual interest rate from a state-run commercial bank. The direct comparison method
determines the price level through the analysis of actual land use right transfers in the
market of similar land categories. The land price table published annually by People's
Committee of the city reflects these new methods of land valuation. On average, the
prices listed in this table are supposed to be about 70 to 80 percent of the actual land
prices in the market (Han and Vu, 2008). Hence, this table is used to determine both tax
and fees associated with land transactions and compensation when land is requisitioned
by the State. The K-coefficient is no longer in use.
IV. Land Acquisition Controversies in Vietnam
1. Land Acquisition and Conflicts
A number of scholars have observed that the widespread transformation of land
uses unleashed by economic liberalization in Vietnam has led to the outbreak of property
rights conflicts. These conflicts manifest themselves in two ways: petitions to the state
offices and confrontational actions of the displaced in public. Since the 1990s, the
number of petitions related to land expropriation has increased sharply. The petitions do
not stop at the level of district authorities but in many cases, often escalate to the
provincial authorities and even to the central organs of the state in Hanoi, because many
displaced households feel discontented with they way their complaints have been handled
by the district authorities (Nguyen, 2007, Kim 2009). In Hanoi, for example, from 2000
to 2006, 585 petitions addressing site clearance, compensation and resettlement disputes
were filed with the city authority (see Table 3). This accounted for over 50% of the total
petitions received by the city government. These petitions came mostly from residents of
the outer and new urban districts of Hanoi, such as Ba Dinh, Tay Ho, Dong Da and Tu
Liem. This is not surprising given that these are localities that have experienced the most
striking spatial effects of economic development and seen many of their previously
agricultural villages and communes facing envelopment into the city.
Public protests about land conversion issues have also started to emerge in various
parts of the country as well. A number of protest incidences have made the headline
news, despite the fact that the state strictly censors all media outlets. In 1997, villagers
gathered in large groups at the headquarters of the commune and districts of Thai Binh
province to directly denounce local officials, whom they accused of illegally authorizing
sales of communal land for private residential and commercial uses (Nguyen, 2007). Also
in 1997, in Ha Bac province, 148 cases of conflict occurred, 75 of which arose because of
land use rights disputes and local cadre corruption (Nguyen, 2007). In 2004, villagers in
Tho Da village on the outskirts of Hanoi opposed the compulsory acquisition of 93 ha of
land for the construction of a golf course by a foreign corporation. Some villagers
resorted to violence to press for higher compensation, and a few was jailed for opposing
the police (Gillespie, 1998). Similarly, in the South, violent protests erupted in 1997 in
Dong Nai province, near Ho Chi Minh City in response to the local authority's
expropriation of the Catholic Church's land in Tra Co commune (Human Rights Watch,
1997). Another protest case involved the alteration of land use plan by the Binh Chanh
District government to increase the amount of requisitioned land for expanding the size
of a French supermarket's parking lot. The displaced households became so furious that
they camped out on one of the city's most prominent boulevards for weeks (Kim 2009).
Table 3: Number of petition related to site clearance submitted to
city authority from 2001 to 2006
First 7
months
District/Department 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 of 2006 Total
Ba Dinh 27 23 56 39 26 4 175
Cau Giay 15 3 19 1 3 5 46
Dong Da 0 1 66 6 2 0 75
Hai Ba Trung 1 6 20 4 1 0 32
Hoan Kiem 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Hoang Mai 0 0 0 2 0 12 14
Long Bien 0 0 0 1 11 9 21
Tay Ho 5 1 4 30 16 22 78
Thanh Xuan 0 0 1 0 1 11 13
Dong Anh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gia Lam 1 0 4 1 2 0 8
Soc Son 2 0 3 2 1 21 29
Thanh Tri 13 7 1 0 11 1 33
Tu Liem 6 3 11 11 3 23 57
Department of Natural
Resources and
Environment 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
Total 70 44 185 98 80 108 585
Total of all petitions 120 109 266 217 184 210 1,106
% of petitions related
to site clearance 58% 40% 70% 45% 43% 51% 53%
Source: Modified from Nguyen and Hoang (2007)
It is apparent then that the institutional setting with the one-party rule and top-
down planning process offers limited political spaces for dissent. Filing petitions is one of
the few institutionalized venues through which the displaced can voice complaints, but
petitions may be lodged to higher and higher bureaus, and disputes may remain unsettled.
This helps explain why the number of popular protests over land takings in Vietnam has
been on the rise in the last decades.
2. Principal causes of conflicts
The tumultuous nature of compulsory land acquisition in Vietnam prompts many
to wonder why this process has caused so much social tension and conflicts. From the
analysis of secondary literature and journalistic accounts on the issue and field interviews
with key informants, I find that the principle causes of public resistance in land
acquisition cases typically revolve around five key issues: 1) the concept of the public
interest, 2) the compensation method, 3) the equity in determining and distributing
compensation, 4) concerns about post-resettlement livelihoods and 5) the transparency
and accountability in the land acquisition process. I will subsequently discuss each of
these key issues in this section. Yet, the controversy over land taking is not specific to
Vietnam but is part of a global trend. Private land owners in other parts of the world have
also challenged their government's right to expropriate land for economic development.
Thus, in the next section, I will compare the nature of taking controversies in Vietnam
with those in the U.S. and China. Although the fiscal constraints and land management
practices of the local governments have led to remarkably similar public debates about
the legitimacy of land expropriation in these countries, there are also fundamental
differences (Kim, 2009).
Concept of the public interest
It has been shown in the previous section of this chapter that in Vietnam, the state
can exercise the right to compulsorily acquire land from individuals, but it has to justify
that the taking is in the public's interest. Land acquisition for public work projects such
as road construction and infrastructure development, while admittedly difficult for the
displaced, qualifies as serving the public interest because these projects deliver benefits
to the majority of the population. Yet, when the government uses this mechanism to
transfer lower-valued agricultural land for higher-valued residential and commercial
development, invoking the "public interest" claim becomes strained (Kim, 2009). Huge
profits gained from land conversion usually accrue to the investors as well as the elite
urban consumers and firms in need of upscale housing and office spaces. But the rural
population who are forced to give up their land for development projects do not get to
share in the appreciation of land value brought by the change in land uses. In an article
published by Tuoi Tre newspaper, the head of residential block group in Mai Dich ward
of Hanoi noted that farmers only received 91,000 VND per square meter in
compensation, but when state employees and urban residents build houses for sale, the
price jumped to 15-20 million VND per square meter, and that this is essentially "taking
asset from the poor to give to the rich" (Da, 2003). Conflicts arise as the public begins to
perceive this uneven distribution of benefits and costs of urban development processes in
Vietnam and question whether land acquisition for residential or commercial
development can be justified as serving the public interest, despite the state's effort to
craft a "public interest" rationale which emphasizes economic growth, and urban housing
shortages.
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Furthermore, the trend toward fiscal decentralization in Vietnam has reduced
central government transfers and left many districts with an unfunded mandate to provide
public services to the sprawling new urban areas. Yet, decentralization also devolves the
authority of local land use planning to district governments, giving them greater
discretion in determining the location of development and the land use of specific sites.
As a result, these local state bodies have increasingly leveraged their control over the
supply of developable land to negotiate with the developers for provision of public goods
such as roads, sewer, drainage pipes, water supply, electricity, and schools in exchange
for approval of their projects and the issuance of land titles after the projects are
completed (Kim, 2009). Besides, as local governments can collect various taxes and fees
from the newly added urban land, land acquisition represents a financial boon to their
increasing budgetary deficits.
With increased involvement of corporate business capital in funding public
services, it is then questionable whether local governments can identify the "real" public
interest while driven by concerns to improve their fiscal conditions and finance
infrastructure development. In fact, many protests have emerged to denounce the
corrupted behavior of local governments in land management practices. Local officials
have been accused of making secret deals with the developers to approve projects and
pressure farmers to sell their land cheaply, or of illegally authorizing sales of communal
land for private development, One article in Tuoi Tre newspaper described a ward
chairman as "powerful, profit hungry" through the sale of public land (Trung 2000).
Other newspapers such as Lao Dong (Trade Union) and Thanh Nien (Youth Union) also
published articles about land disputes that included criticism of local leaders several
times a month (Kim, 2008). When the private land interest becomes the "public interest",
the legitimacy behind land takings largely erodes, and local governments lose their
credibility.
Compensation Method
The Law requires that the project-affected persons be compensated by land
allotments of similar area and standard with the compulsorily acquired land, or an
equivalent level of monetary compensation, or residential dwellings. Due to land supply
constraints, most projects offer compensation in the form of resettlement housing, cash or
the combination of the two.
Many articles establish the link between rising land acquisition disputes to the
inadequacy of resettlement options. Resettlement zones are rarely completed by the time
the site clearance process takes place. The Thu Thiem new urban area project provides a
striking example. According to Lao Dong newspaper, although the project was initiated
in 2005, 12,500 resettlement units still have not been constructed, making it impossible to
clear land because residents in this area have no where to relocate to. In many cases, the
supply of resettlement housing isn't sufficient to meet the demand for resettlement from
development projects. Quy (2008) reported that out of 35 on-going projects in District 2
of Ho Chi Minh City that were funded by the state budget, 20 projects needed to relocate
residents but the city could only provide resettlement land and housing for two projects.
In Nha Be district of Ho Chi Minh City, there were a total of 56 projects in 2008, but
only 7 could proceed, while the rest was put on hold because of the severe shortages in
resettlement land and housing. As a result, many affected households are held in
temporary shelters for an extended period of time or have to resort to their own means to
find replacement housing.
Moreover, resettlement units are often constructed in the form of apartment
complexes located far away from the city center or the project site. According to key
informants, this is problematic for several reasons. First, households tend to have issue
with living in apartments that are much smaller than their previous houses and lack open
space for planting trees or raising livestock, and want to be compensated by land to
continue agricultural work or construct their own houses. Second, households dislike
being relocated to a completely unfamiliar area distant from their old socio-economic
milieu. Yet, if the project offers only cash compensation instead of providing options for
resettlement, many households deem that the amount of cash received isn't sufficient to
repurchase a new house anywhere in the city. In the absence of effectively functioning
land and labor markets, and adequate social safety nets, cash compensation alone cannot
realistically provide satisfactory outcomes for those who are dependent on land for a
living.
Equity in Compensation
The Vietnamese government enacts pricing formula for calculating land values
and determining compensation in cases of compulsory acquisition. Although the 2003
Land Law requires provincial authorities to set land price close to the actual market price
of land use right transfers, state prices hardly reflects the prevailing market rates. A
common fact addressed in many articles and reports is that land price in the real property
market is often nine to ten times higher than the prices provided by the government. In
Ho Chi Minh City for example, while the city regulates compensation for agricultural
land to be 200 thousand VND per square meter, it is transacted at 2-3 million per square
meter in the market (Phuc, 2008). Moreover, as mentioned above, land users are
compensated on the basis of existing land use categories, so the displaced do not benefit
from the value increase that results from the re-categorization of agricultural land for
urban use. Without a proper mechanism for land valuation, and a "just" compensation
principle, problems with site clearance becomes complex and difficult to resolve.
Compensation levels are also deemed unfair by land users due to the
inconsistency across projects, administrative boundaries and across different time.
Different compensation rates may apply for adjacent plots lying within different
administrative jurisdictions. Even when projects are located in the same locality, publicly
funded projects tend to offer lower compensation than commercial projects. Moreover,
compensation may also be different for households who move out at different time
periods. Examples of inconsistent land compensation and resettlement subsidies may be
countless. In a Tuoi Tre article, the general manager of a large real estate corporation
recounted that in one of its first projects, the company was able to obtain 99% of the land,
but for the last remaining households owning 500 square meters, the developer had to
offer them on-site resettlement and paid an additional 5 million VND per square meter
(Phuc, 2008). Another article in Hanoi Moi shows that within Soc Son province of Hanoi,
three projects had completely different compensation structure. Although residents here
possessed the same land use certificates, in the first project, land was classified as forest
land, whereas in the other two projects, land was determined as residential. Therefore,
some residents received compensation "amounting to billions of VND", while others had
to accept much lower rate (Kieu and Tuan, 2008). Such inequity in compensation
contributes to rising tensions and distrust between local residents and the government.
Post-land acquisition livelihoods
The goal of the resettlement policy, as stated in the Land Law, is to restore the
living standards and earning capacities of the replaced individuals, and when possible, to
improve them. However, this is a formidable task to fulfill in the absence of effectively
functioning land and labor markets, and adequate social safety nets. As a result, many
peasants end up living under worse conditions several years after their land was
recovered by the sate than they did before. Without appropriate job training, job
replacement and experience in managing their lump sum payment and appropriate
investment channels (if their compensation is sufficient to make any investment at all), it
is common for peasants to end up with no land to farm, no income stream to support
themselves, and no job skills to compete in the tight urban job markets. There are many
articles addressing this livelihood issue. One article in Tuoi Tre for example mentioned
that in the meeting with the Minister of the Ministry of Resources and the Environment,
farmers in Viet Hung commune of Hanoi expressed the fear that with the current pace of
urbanization and industrialization, all land for cultivation would be wiped out in two
years (Da, 2003). In another article in Lao Dong newspaper, Mr. C in Mau Luong ward
of Ha Dong province lamented that rice had nurtured farmers for many generations, and
without land for rice cultivation, their lives would be uprooted (Giang, 2008).
Transparency and Accountability
Many news articles report that citizens complain about the lack of transparency in
obtaining land, measuring land and determining the associating level of compensation.
Some developers can acquire land if they have strong political connections. Deals made
between local officials and developers are hardly transparent, and lucrative kickbacks are
anticipated as local officials expect developers to reward them for their approval of
projects and assistance in land acquisition. On some occasions, they even colluded with
households to help them secure more compensation money. An example of this appeared
in Hanoi Moi newspaper. The local officials verified that the 211,17 m2 of land Mrs.
Nguyen owned was "residential land that the family had used constantly since before
October 1993", while in reality, Mrs. Nguyen's family has illegally squatted on this land
since 2000. Mrs. Nguyen was therefore compensated 550 million VND when this land
was requisitioned for a resort development project. Besides, local officials also condoned
the inaccurate measurement that increased the land parcel by 68.12 m2 to help Mrs.
Nguyen extract 177 million VND more from the state budget (Kieu and Tuan, 2008).
Another issue is that residents are not well-informed of the compensation plan and
their rights. There are virtually no effective channels for citizens to voice their dissents.
Citizens can file petition to the People's Committee at the district or city level, but these
offices are usually slow to respond to land-related disputes.
In sum, the analysis of land-taking controversies in Vietnam reveals that
compensation, particularly the way it is determined and distributed, coupled with issues
about post-resettlement livelihoods creates and intensifies social conflicts. The local
governments are increasingly being under attack for their questionable ability to identify
the public interest in an era of increasing public-private partnerships in local public goods
provision.
3. Comparison with land-taking controversies in other countries
The use of taking power by government bodies to expropriate land for economic
development purpose has also occasioned considerable controversy in other countries
across the globe. Rather than being mere coincidence, these controversies were deeply
rooted in a widely-shared sentiment that the public sector has been compromising its
ability to serve the larger public by relying on private capital to solve its budgetary deficit
problem.
Over the past decades, the restructuring of inter-governmental relationship in
many countries has shifted the responsibility of public services provision from the central
to lower levels of government. This trend is lauded by many economists and international
institutions since the local governments, being closer to the people, are deemed more
capable of catering public goods and services to citizen's preferences and demand.
Decentralization also reduces the fiscal transfer from the central government to local
government. With a budget that is incommensurate with increased responsibilities, local
governments have been devising their own strategies to spur economic growth and
finance public service provision.
In China, one of the means through which local governments increase revenues
for financing urban expansion is land acquisition and public land leasing (Ding 2007,
Zhu, 2004). Similar to Vietnam, agricultural land in China can only be traded in the
market after it has been requisitioned by the state and converted to state-owned urban
land (Po, 2008). The local governments have therefore exercised their strong
administrative power to expropriate land from farmers at low cost and lease it to the
investors at much higher prices. Investors typically would have to pay land use
conveyance fee, which is a lump sum, upfront land rent payment to the local
governments. The amount of the fee depends on the leasing periods and land use
intensity, but according to Ding (2007), it can be ten times more than the cost of
acquiring and developing the land. In addition to the conveyance fees, local governments
can also collect various taxes and fees associated with land acquisition, such as farmland
occupation tax, land management fee, vegetation development funds, etc. Hence, the
financial impacts of land acquisition are enormous. It is estimated that revenues
generated from land can account for up to 60% of total fiscal incomes of local
governments while taxes and fees can account for up to 45-55% of total costs of land
acquisition (Ding, 2007).
Despite China's national policy of preserving arable land, and safeguarding food
supply, local governments have been converting land for non-agricultural uses on a
massive scale. In 2004, the country's different levels of local governments requisitioned a
total of 1,612.6 square kilometers of land, which generated 615 billion yuan (77 billion
US dollars) in local revenue (Po 2008). During the land requisition process, farmers are
entitled to a payment that equals 6 to 10 times the average annual output of the acquired
land in the preceding 3 years (Ding, 2007, Guo 2002). Thus, compensation is priced
according to the value of land of the current use, not the value at which land will be
traded in the urban market. Po (2008) shows that compensation usually represents only
3% to 5% of the land sale revenue. As a result, even though land conversion drives
agricultural land price ever higher, the dispossessed farmers fail to capture any profitable
share of this increased wealth as landowners. Guo's analysis of the expropriation of 850
mu of farmland in a village in Yunnan province of China illustrates vividly this
exploitative nature of land acquisition (2001). Compensation to the villagers was only 5-
10 percent of the total income from land sales, while the rest of the money flowed to the
township and country government. Yet, neither the township nor the county government
spent this substantial increase in revenue on investment in agriculture. Instead, the
majority of the funds have been used for administrative and institutional expansion and
urban infrastructure upgrading. This predatory behavior of the local state in extracting
large amounts of land, while providing so little collective goods for the villages have
driven many farmers to take action. The escalating conflicts in Chinese rural society
today are the very outcomes of continuous land expropriation that has deprived farmers
of livelihood and welfare, and preventing them from benefiting from the prosperity
generated by land development.
Furthermore, China's distinctive land ownership structure in which urban land is
owned by the state and agricultural land by the rural collectives also causes many
contradictions. Under collective ownership, compensation for the requisitioned land is
delivered to the rural collectives, rather than to individual farmers, as in the case of
Vietnam. The rural collectives hold and manage the compensation fees, and have the
power to decide how much and in what form compensation is redistributed to individual
farmers (Po, 2008). As there is no clear definition of what collective ownership means
and who exactly represent the "collectives" in the course of exercising property rights,
the local government officials who hold the reins of power are the de facto owner of the
collective property. Individual farmers have no demonstrable right to the management of
compensation fees or the transfer of collective land. In the absence of villagers'
participation in the management of collective property, collective compensation fees are
drained simply by poor management and sometimes, outright corruption (Po, 2008). It is
precisely this ambiguity of collective ownership and local officials' myopic behaviors in
handling collective compensation fees that have ignited local conflicts.
In Western countries, government authorities have also used the taking power to
acquire private property for economic development in many instances. Here too, clashes
against land takings have emerged. The U.S., for example, in the mid-20th century,
invoked eminent domain to enable the redevelopment of blighted properties as part of its
urban renewal effort. This set off widespread controversies since the program displaced
hundreds of thousands of poor and minority households, and allowed private entities to
be the owners of redeveloped properties. With the termination of the program in early
1970s, the controversy died only to be reinvigorated recently. City governments have
again exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire private property and transfer it to
private, for-profit developers for economic revitalization purposes pursuant to a city's
development plan, despite the fact that the property itself may not be blighted (Keating,
2007). Much like the public responses in Vietnam and China, individuals and
organizations have mounted campaigns to dispute the legality of such action, and demand
local governments to restrict their use of eminent domain power. However, whereas in
Asian transition countries, compensation for the affected parties has frequently been a
major point of contention in land acquisition cases, in the U.S., because of the well-
developed legal system with detailed provisions to protect the rights of property owners,
and a property appraisal system based on actual market transactions, the property owners
are ensured fair and equitable treatment when their properties are taken for public use.
Therefore, rather than centering on compensation, the debate over eminent domain in the
U.S is framed around the symbolic value of home and home ownership, which cannot be
entirely compensated monetarily (Kim, 2009). The strong attachment of Americans to
their homes is a deep-seated value in American society. This explains why some families
in the New London land taking controversy opposed relocation, even though they were
offered twice the market value for their houses (Kim, 2009).
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the legal framework that structures the
process of compulsory land acquisition in Vietnam and discussed key parameters of
conflicts in land acquisition cases both in Vietnam and abroad. In an era of fiscal
decentralization, local governments have become extremely entrepreneurial. In Vietnam,
they leverage their control over land use planning to require developers to build public
infrastructure in exchange for approval of development projects. In China, they use their
monopoly power over agricultural land to acquire it from the farmers at really low cost
and sell it to developers at much higher prices for urban use, and make windfall gains
from changing land use. Despite the positive fiscal impacts of land acquisition, the socio-
economic inequity, increasing tension between farmers and the local governments, and
extensive loss of farmland are undesirable byproducts of this process. Lacking alternative
employment opportunities, and receiving meager compensation, many farmers have
engaged in acts of resistance to challenge the legitimacy of local governments and
demand better compensation. In Vietnam, it is common that development projects are
stalled indefinitely as a result of complication with the land acquisition process. Housing
developers have noted that land acquisition is the most difficult step in the development
process. In the next chapter, I will introduce the case of Van Quan and its rapid land
acquisition process and explain why this is an anomalous outcome that deserves further
inquiry.
CHAPTER 3
The Anomaly - Land Acquisition for Van Quan
I. State-Owned Enterprises and Housing Production
1. The emergence of state-owned developers
As shown in Chapter 1, with the launch of comprehensive economic reforms, the
Vietnamese state has given up its unique control on housing production and allowed new
actors to participate in the housing market. Liberalized housing policies coupled with
increased private wealth have created favorable conditions for households to build or
improve their housing conditions using their own funds. In the 1990s, statistics shows
that 70% to 80% of construction activity was carried out privately by individual
households (Waibel, 2006). A large part of this building activity, however, proceeded
without legal construction approval or adherence to planning and building regulations.
The spontaneous and unregulated nature of self-built housing has created the most
chaotic urban development patterns and posed mounting challenges for urban
management.
In the late 1990s, in an effort to restrain spontaneous construction and make
housing development conform to the city's master and detailed plans, the government
issued policies to encourage developers to build planned developments. Since late 1990s,
central and local state-owned construction companies have increasingly assumed the role
of commercial developers and built a significant number of serviced lots and houses for
sale in cities throughout Vietnam. These government enterprises are the business arms of
the Ministry of Construction or provincial-level People's Committee, operating with
funding from the central or provincial budget, state banks and housing buyers (see Table
4). They are engaged in, but not wholly dedicated to the business of developing middle
and high income urban housing through new urban area projects. This regain of state
control in housing production can be attributed to multiple reasons, among which are the
prospect for enormous profits in a heated property market, and the availability of large
real estate properties in the possession of the national and local institutions (Waibel,
2006). The increasing involvement of large state-owned developers in housing
production has raised the state's share in Hanoi's housing supply from 3.9% in 1995 to
36% in 2002 (Waibel, 2006). Over 50 carefully planned new urban areas with well-
equipped infrastructure and residential housing units have been or are being built in the
periphery of the city core. Five new urban areas have been completed. It is projected that
state-controlled company will develop 7.9 million square meters of new living space in
Hanoi alone by 2010 (Waibel, 2006).
A few privately owned businesses have also been producing serviced land parcels
or houses for sale, but these private developers seem to be mostly active in the South of
Vietnam and undertake much smaller projects. Land and housing development in the
North are overwhelmingly dominated by state-owned companies. Certainly, the role of
Hanoi as the country's capital and as the home of political decision-makers, who may not
wish to leave all potential profits to private companies and who may want to serve their
clientele seems to be important in this context. Foreign developers have limited presence
in the Vietnam real estate market, and usually exist in the form of joint-ventures with
state-owned companies because the Vietnamese Land Law prohibits the grant of land use
rights to foreigners.
Table 4: Major state-owned developers in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC)
Founder Developer Main Business Lines
- Develop big projects over 10 ha in Hanoi
Housing and Urban Development - Develop the first new urban area in Hanoi
Corporation (HUD) - Less active in Ho Chi Minh City
- Develop big projects over 10 ha in Hanoi
- Is a construction contractor
- Import-export of technical labor force
Ministry of Vietnam Construction and Import- - Import and export of civil work equipment and
Construction Export Corporation (Vinaconex)* material
- Is under Department of Land and Housing
Hanoi Housing Development - Engage in small 5-6 ha projects
Company - Likely to be merged in an umbrella organization
- Under Department of Construction
Hanoi People's Hanoi Housing Construction - Engage in small 5-6 ha projects
Committee Company - Likely to be merged in an umbrella organization
- Is a dominant state-owned developer in HCMC
HCMC People's Saigon Real Estate Corporation - Umbrella organization holding sixteen
Committee (RESCO) subsidiaries
Source: JBIC (1999)
* Vinaconex was equitized and turned into a joint-stock company in 2000
2. The Development of "New Urban Areas"
As mentioned above, to avoid unplanned private construction, the government has
issued policies to promote the development of housing through new urban area projects.
After a period of experimentation, this model of housing development has been widely
applied and become a major part of the housing development strategy of Hanoi from
2000-2010. It is also considered to be a viable solution to the city's current housing
shortages and anarchic urban forms.
The new urban area projects represent mixed residential and commercial
developments on the outskirts of major metropolitan areas with synchronized
infrastructure system including road, sewage, water supply, electricity, etc. and public
facilities, such as sub-district committee office, police station, kindergarten, supermarket,
and health center. The projects provide three types of residential housing, including row
houses that are 4 - 5m in width, 12 - 16m in length and 3 - 4 stories high, villas with
average land area ranging from 200 to 300 square meters, and high-rise condominiums
that are 9-12 stories high and equipped with elevators. In addition, commercial buildings
such as offices, hotels, leisure centers, and supermarkets are also constructed on the site.
New urban areas projects differ from other housing development projects in their
scale and scope. They are medium and large-scale development which vary in sizes from
20 to 200 hectares, and are designed to provide housing for 10 to 20 thousand inhabitants
(Dinh, 2001). Moreover, instead of just providing residential housing, these projects aim
to create self-contained urban spaces that integrate living, shopping, working, healthcare
and recreation. Therefore, public facilities and commercial spaces are developed in
conjunction with residential units in the project area.
The new urban areas are planned in accordance with the detailed plan of the
locality where they are located. Today several projects have already been completed,
some are being constructed and others are in the stage of planning. Figure 5 shows the
location of these projects in Hanoi. The built areas, for example Linh Dam and Trung
Hoa-Nhan Chinh, have become popular residential areas with modem architecture, full
service apartments and single-family houses and high occupancy rate.
State-owned real estate companies have been active developers of new urban
areas throughout Vietnam. They are often appointed by the city government to invest in
these projects. They are responsible for paying the land-use fee to the state according to
existing laws and regulations. The process of developing a new urban area usually
involves three main steps: site clearance, construction, marketing and sales. After
receiving the approval for planning, building permit, and other relevant documents, the
developers conduct the relocation and compensation for households already residing in
the project areas. The construction works, such as leveling the site, building infrastructure
immediately follow the site clearance process. Once infrastructure is completed, the
developer can sell the serviced land parcels to customers, who will construct houses
according to their preferences, or build various kinds of houses for sale. Whether the
houses are built by the developers or the buyers, the construction must be in compliance
with the planning regulations of the projects. The developer can also build commercial
buildings or sell the land use right to other investors. After finishing the project, the
developer will transfer the infrastructure system as well as the land for public facilities to
the city government.
Figure 5: Location of planned and implemented new urban areas in Hanoi
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Capital for new urban area projects is mobilized from a number of financial
sources such as state budget, preferential loan, commercial credit, project bond, etc.
However, advanced payment from home buyers is by far the most important form of
financing. The key advantage of this kind of capital is that the developer can mobilize a
large sum of money without having to pay any interest. In the projects that have been
implemented by HUD, for example, this form of capital mobilization often makes up
more than 70% of the total capital (Dinh, 2001).
New urban area projects have greatly contributed to the expansion of the city's
housing stock and the de-densification of the urban core neighborhoods. Moreover, the
sparse building structure, spacious streets, and ample public spaces in the project areas
help create an open and salubrious environ that is usually non-existent in the crowded old
residential quarters. Despite these positive impacts, Waibel (2006) observes that the
development of new urban areas has intensified the process of physical, functional and
social segregation within Vietnam's cities. Enormous speculation in the real estate
market, together with huge demand for living space due to the pressures of economic
growth and urbanization has resulted in sky-rocketing land and housing prices, making it
unaffordable to the majority of the urban population. Consequently, access to the new
urban areas has become socially highly selective. These urban areas tend to serve the
needs of Vietnam's middle and high income urban elites. They are also physically
separated from their surroundings and perform more as gated communities. There is
much less social interaction in the new urban areas than in the traditional quarters. The
people living here are working elsewhere and during office hours, the areas are more or
less empty. In the evening, except for local restaurants and cafes, most of the areas stay
quite. This lack of visible outdoor activities starkly contrasts the vibrant and sociable
urban environments seen in other parts of the cities.
II. HUD's Profile
The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUD) is a 100% state-owned
real estate corporation founded in 2000 by the Ministry of Construction. Since its birth,
HUD has quickly established a strong foothold in Vietnam's real estate industry. HUD's
primary line of business is developing medium and large-scale new urban areas, and
economic and industrial zones in Hanoi, HCMC and other provinces throughout
Vietnam, but it also offers other services, such as technical consulting, and import and
export of construction equipment and materials. HUD has 18 subsidiaries specializing in
housing development, construction, consulting, manufacturing of construction materials
and other services. At the moment, the corporation has a capital of 6 billion VND and
shares and equities in 20 companies in Vietnam (HUDFIC's website). In 2008, HUD had
a total business production value of five trillion VND, total investment capital of four
trillion VND, and revenue of 4,150 trillion dong, a 30% rise from 2007. By the end of
2008, HUD posted a 300 billion VND profit, achieving 136% of that year's plan and paid
250 billion VND in taxes (Vnrealestatemarket.com)
HUD is the first developer to be appointed by the Hanoi city government to
pioneer the development of new urban areas in Vietnam. HUD implemented two pilot
new urban area projects, Linh Dam Lake Development Project and Dinh Cong New
Urban Area Project and achieved great financial and social success with both projects.
Since then, this new model of housing development has been widely disseminated and
adopted by other real estate developers across the country. However, HUD remains the
dominant player in this business. Since 2000, it has implemented 35 projects on 4,600 ha
of land and contributed more than 100 thousand residential units with total floor area of
1.5 million square meters to the country's housing stock (HUD's website).
III. Van Quan Project Background
Located in the town of Ha Dong, about 9 km south-west from the center of Hanoi,
the capital city of Vietnam, the Van Quan new urban area is considered to be a strategic
housing development because the proximity of Ha Dong to Hanoi means that within 10
years from the time of the project development in 2002, this town will likely become part
of Hanoi as the city expands west. In fact, in 2008, the Hanoi administration announced
the city's expansion plan to merge with Ha Tay, and part of Vinh Phuc and Hoa Binh
province. With the incorporation of neighboring provinces into Hanoi, Ha Dong became
a new urban district. The master plans of Hanoi and Ha Dong published by the Chief
Architecture's Office in 2000 both contained regulations about the development in Van
Quan. However, the master plan of Hanoi did not give detailed regulations for this
development because the project area still lies in the jurisdiction of Ha Tay province,
even though it was planned as a new residential area of Hanoi.
The Van Quan project site is situated within 2 wards of Ha Dong: Van Mo and
Phuc La. The total area of the project is 62.5 ha, with 33 ha belonging to Van Mo ward
and 29.5 ha to Phuc La ward. 85% of the land on the site is used for agricultural purpose
and 4.1% of industrial purpose. Other land use categories such as residential land,
religious land and cemetery account for a very small portion (3% to 5%) of the total land
area. Table 5 shows the distribution of land in the project area by purpose of use.
Figure 6: Location of the Van Quan New Urban Area
Table 5: Pre-development land use in Van Quan project site
Type of Land Area (m2) Percent
Residential Land 9,400 1.49%
Public land 10,848 1.72%
Schools 2,450
Public offices, police station 2,909
Health centers 1,309
Trees, sports fields 4,180
Transportation 32,000 5.06%
Industrial Land 25,522 4.04%
Cemetery Land 19,620 3.10%
Religious Land 440 0.07%
Agricultural Land 534,670 84.53%
Total 632,500
Source: HUD's project report (2003)
The Van Quan project promises the development of new residential area with
high-standard infrastructure, low density development, and plenty of green and open
spaces for approximately 14,500 residents. Three types of housing are offered in the
project: high-rise condominiums, town houses and villas. In addition, there are
commercial area designated for restaurants, shops and other retail services as well as
public facilities such as schools, health centers, parks, playgrounds and recreational areas.
Table 6 shows the land use planning for Van Quan. Only 42% of the total project area is
planned for residential development, while the remaining land is devoted to public
facilities and transportation-related projects.
Table 6: Land use planning for Van Quan new urban area
Number Category Area (m2) Percent
Total Project Area 625,300
I Residential Land 262,370 41.96%
High-rise condominiums 85,590 13.69%
Town houses 128,020 20.47%
Villas 48,760 7.80%
Existing residential land 9,400 1.50%
II Land for public use 177,500 28.39%
Schools 36,120 5.78%
Public works 10,630 1.70%
Health centers 800 0.13%
Trees, sports fields 18,520 2.96%
Public offices, police station 11,110 1.78%
Central park 100,320 16.04%
Lake 59,320 9.49%
Trees 41,000 6.56%
III Land for Transportation 142,000 22.71%
Road network 134,480 21.51%
Parking 7,520 1.20%
IV Land beyond residents' use 43,430 6.95%
Land for key transportation nodes 1,930 0.31%
Inter-area transportation 41,500 6.64%
Source: HUD's project report (2003)
Van Quan was implemented over a three year period from quarter three of 2002 to
the end of 2005. The total capital for the project was 285 billion VND. Of this amount,
155 billion was spent on infrastructure development and public facilities, and 60 billion
on land acquisition. HUD received funding from the state budget for constructing a 36
meter road leading to the project site. But the rest of the capital needed for the project
comes from the company's own equity and other financial resources.
IV. Land Acquisition for Van Quan - The Anomalous Outcome
In order to assemble land for the project, as mentioned in the last chapter, HUD
would have to handle site clearance and compensation negotiations with the current land
users on the basis of a state "frame" compensation price. Since new urban area projects
are considered crucial for national economic development, compulsory land acquisition is
justified in this case. Moreover, 85% of the land in the project site is farmland that needs
to be converted to urban land for non-agricultural use, and the state is the only entity with
legitimate power to realize this conversion, consolidating land for this project necessarily
requires the use of taking power.
The process of land acquisition for Van Quan began in early 2003, after the city
government approved the project, granted HUD construction permit, and issued the order
of compulsory acquisition. HUD began surveying the project site to compile data on the
households in the area earmarked for development. HUD formulated a compensation plan
based on this data and submitted it to the People's Committee of Ha Tay province. The
plan was approved at the end of January 2003. HUD informed the affected households of
the acquisition decision and conducted compensation negotiations. In June 2003, the site
was completely cleared for construction to proceed. Table 7 shows the approved
compensation price for agricultural land in the project area. Comparing the compensation
price for Van Quan with that offered for Ciputra South Thang Long, a 405-hectare new
urban area near the West Lake of Hanoi developed in 2003 by an Indonesian developer,
we can see that the price is fairly similar at least for the first land grade.
Table 7: Compensation Rate for Van Quan and Ciputra project
Agricultural
Land Grade Van Quan Ciputra
Grade 1 250,000 VND/m2 257,000 VND/m2
Grade2 200,000 VND/m2 248,000 VND/m2
Grade 3 150,000 VND/m2 240,000 VND/m2
Source: Site clearance plan, and Vnexpress.net
In the last chapter, we learn that land acquisition in Vietnam is rife with disputes
and conflicts. It is then not surprising that site clearance and compensation is a
particularly arduous and long process, especially when projects require the assembly of
many land parcels. The reasons for land acquisition stalemates are many, but issues of
compensation and livelihood appear to be the main point of contention. Compensation
rates regulated by the government are often far lower than the actual market land prices.
Therefore, it is difficult to reach a sensible agreement on compensation between
developers and farming households. On the other hand, many farmers fear that the taking
of cultivated land will deprive them of their livelihoods because alternative employment
opportunities do not abound. They also don't want to move to resettlement zones and
establish a new life in a strange area without the familiar social support network.
Consequently, many farmers have refused to agree to a proposed compensation price and
yield land to the developers. Foot-dragging and holding out are common acts of
resistance that farmers resort to during the site clearance process, which has significantly
impeded the project progress. It is estimated that 80% to 90% of real estate development
projects in Hanoi experience major delay due to protracted site clearance (Nguyen and
Hoang, 2007). Kim's study of private land development entrepreneurs in HCMC (2008)
documents that it usually takes these developers six months to two years to complete land
acquisition for projects that are two to ten hectares in size. In many cases, compensation
negotiations lasted for several years and the cost of site clearance accounted for 90% of
the total project capital (Phuc, 2008). In some cases, projects are even stalled indefinitely.
State-owned developers also encounter similar challenges. Dinh (2001) notes that state-
owned developers find handling land acquisition and compensation to be the most
difficult step in implementing new urban area projects, and one that often results in
project delays.
Against this common reality of land acquisition impasse that has frequently
slowed or halted many housing development projects, it is expected that the site clearance
and compensation process for Van Quan would be ridden with conflicts and delays
because the amount of land required for and number of households affected by such a
large-scale project is extensive. Yet, HUD was able to complete acquiring 62 hectares of
land within 6 months. Given this anomalous nature, it is then certainly intriguing to
investigate why Van Quan had such a speedy land acquisition process, while it usually
takes much longer to assemble land for other similar development projects.
V. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed the emergence of state-owned developers in
Vietnam's housing market as well as the model of housing development through new
urban area projects. I then introduced the case of Van Quan and its speedy land
acquisition process, as well as provided detailed information on HUD, the developer of
Van Quan. Since the liberalization of the housing market, state-owned developers have
emerged to be a dominant player in the Vietnam and have been most active in developing
mixed-use new urban areas with infrastructure and public facilities on previously
agricultural villages on the outskirts of major cities. The process of land acquisition for
these projects are however more complex because the developers would have to handle
compensation negotiations with multiple land owners. It is then surprising that HUD
could complete assembling land for the Van Quan project within 6 months, although the
project requires the acquisition of 62 hectares of land. Did HUD face any problems
during the site clearance process? What were the methods HUD adopted to overcome
these problems? And above all, what can be generalized about the factors that may
contribute to efficiency of site clearance from this case? In the next chapter, I will present
in great details the problems with site clearance for Van Quan and the specific methods
that HUD adopted to deal with these problems based on the findings from my fieldwork.
CHAPTER 4
The Process of Land Acquisition for Van Quan
I. Socio-economic conditions of the displaced
The Van Quan site clearance process involves the acquisition of 54 hectares of
agricultural land from roughly 300 farming households. The average size of an affected
household is 4 persons. Each household on average has 2 laborers. The education level
in the village is mainly primary and secondary levels. Generally, senior people have
primary level education. Meanwhile, the young generation mostly has basic secondary
education.
Households in the Van Quan area have been assigned agricultural land use
rights by the state since 1994. At that time, each farmer received an area of around
500 m2 per capita. While cultivating on the agricultural land in the project area, farmers
resided in Yen Xa village, a rural village adjacent to the project site. Though the capital is
just 9 km away, the village remained predominantly rural, with its residents living in
simple one-storey brick houses, engaging in agricultural work and leading a slow-paced
lifestyle.
The primary income of these households is from rice or vegetable cultivation.
Some households received assistance from their relatives in the cities. There are also 10
households with income source from hired labors. A couple of family-run shops selling
fruits, stationery, toys and candy existed in the village. The average per capita income
was 600 thousand to 800 thousand VND per month in 2003, which exceeded the 2003
national average per capita income of 484 thousand VND (Bich, 2005). Although the
similar income figure for Ha Dong town is not available for 2003, this number is
estimated to be 2 million VND in 2008 (Le, 2008). Assuming that the annual income
growth rate is 5%, the average per capita income in Ha Dong should be around 1 million
in 2003. Therefore, the average income of residents in Yen Xa still falls significantly
below the town's average.
II. Problems with land acquisition or lack thereof
Interviews with the development team of the Van Quan project showed that there
were obviously multiple problems with the site clearance process for Van Quan, and
some of the problems discussed in chapter 3 as stalling other projects, as, also applied to
this project. Firstly, the site clearance team members mentioned that the majority of
project-affected farmers questioned the public purpose of the acquisition, because land
would be used to launch commercial and residential development for sale, and thus
generating huge profits to the developer. Moreover, they often highlighted the large
discrepancy between the proposed compensation and the proposed sale price of land in
the project to urban residents during site clearance negotiations, and told the developer
that this price differential is "unacceptable". The compensation price ranged from 143
thousand to 223 thousand VND per square meter of agricultural land while serviced land
parcels would be sold at 11 million VND per square meter in the urban land market.
Secondly, cash compensation was singled out by the interviewees as an unsatisfactory
compensation method. Many team members believed that site clearance would be easier
if the residents were compensated by agricultural land or service land. Thirdly, team
members said that all farmers were concerned about their incomes after losing
agricultural land, and posed many questions regarding job training and alternative
employment opportunities to the developer during planning meetings. Most of them were
in the working age, but had low level of educational attainment and lacked the skills to
compete for jobs in the modern economy.
In addition to these three main points of contention that caused farmers to be
hesitant about giving up their land, the site clearance team also discussed other problems.
These include the lack of land titles or equivalent legal documents, illegal construction of
residential units on agricultural land, illegal purchase or sale of agricultural and property
disputes. According to the Vietnam Land Law, if households don't possess valid
documents to prove ownership status, or their land has been involved in illegal
transactions or disputes, they will not be entitled to any compensation when land is
compulsorily acquired. Therefore, negotiating a compensation deal with these households
and persuade them to move out would take longer. However, the site clearance team also
noted the number of households falling in this category was really negligible. Other
households which the interviewees deemed "equally problematic to deal with" were
households receiving governmental support because they were families of wounded
soldiers or families with members died in the wars. They relied on this special status to
reject the proposed compensation and insist for more compensation. Of course, there
were households who refused to renounce their land simply because in an interviewee's
words, "they were being greedy and unreasonable".
However, the head of the site clearance team for Van Quan commented that the
majority of villagers were "good and considerate citizens". They understood that the
project was necessary for the economic development of Ha Dong and with little
persuasion, eagerly accepted the rate that was offered. Moreover, the requisitioned land
was almost entirely agricultural land that had been allocated to farming households with a
secured tenure for planting crops or vegetables. When displaced households were offered
a cash compensation for their land, which was a much bigger lump sum than their annual
farm income, many were lured by the possibilities that this money could bring:
renovating home, buying motorbikes, sending their children to college, etc., and agreed to
take the cash. In addition, since the majority of land in the project site was agricultural
land and land owners only cultivated on this land but resided in a nearby village, there
was no need to compensate affected farmers with residential land or housing. This also
means that concerns from the farmers about having leaving their hometown and familiar
social networks to relocate to new areas and living in apartment complexes did not exist.
This is a major advantage for the Van Quan site clearance process, because disputes
surrounding resettlement issues from displaced residents have frequently held up other
projects.
The site clearance team said that there were no controversies related the
determination of land area because officials from the district level were responsible for
measuring and evaluating land. On the day of measurement, these officials would be
accompanied by a ward-level official and the residents themselves to measure the land
and determine assets on the land. The residents were present throughout the process so
any disagreement would be resolved immediately under the witness of the local official,
who was familiar with the residents and their land parcels. The final document would
have the approval signature of all three parties.
The project's site clearance process was also greatly facilitated by the flexible
local regulations. Van Quan was initiated at the end of 2002, before the issuance of the
new Land Law and new regulations guiding the implementation of compensation and
resettlement when the state requisitions land for public purpose. During this period, land
acquisition was governed by Decree 22, which stipulated that the land compensation
price should be determined by the People's Committee at the city/province level based on
the government's price framework and the K-factor. This K-factor varies depending on
localities and on projects. However, since Van Quan was the first large-scale housing
development project in Ha Dong town of Ha Tay province, Ha Tay had not yet developed
detailed regulations and local land price tables to guide this development process. The
developer had to work closely with the provincial government to formulate the site
clearance and compensation plan. But undeveloped official policy guidelines also meant
that the developer could be a little bit flexible with the K factor as well other monetary
support for the farmers and the local government.
Another factor that also contributed to the efficiency of Van Quan's site clearance
is the effective local land management practice. All agricultural land in the project area
had been titled. The extent of illegal construction on agricultural land or illegal purchase
or sale of agricultural land beyond the scope of the authority was also rather limited.
III. HUD's strategies
Despite benefiting from many favorable local conditions in implementing site
clearance for Van Quan, discontent with compensation and livelihood issues still drove
farmers to resist giving up their land and could potentially prolong site clearance or even
stall the project. However, development happened according to the projected timeline and
there was no significant delay during the process of land acquisition. The development
team said that Van Quan was considered the most successful residential development
project in HUD's portfolio so far. How did HUD then overcome problems that arose
during site clearance and avoid impasse in compensation negotiations? Through my
interviews, I found out that HUD had to rely on multiple methods to cultivate relationship
with both the local government and the farmers in order to successfully complete site
clearance. I will subsequently discuss each of these methods in greater details.
Resizing the project
Before development, the total land area of the project site was estimated to be 63
hectares, the majority of which was agricultural land. However, there was also 0.94
hectare of residential land located near the border of the project site in Van Mo ward. A
residential cluster with 73 households and roughly 300 residents were living on this land.
The site clearance team admitted that it was impossible to acquire 100% of the land area
according to the proposed plan because compensation negotiations were obviously much
more cumbersome when the issue of resettlement was brought into the picture. There
were a lot more resistance from the households. HUD found that the amount of land
acquired accounted for a very small part of the project site (1.6%), but the cost to acquire
it in terms of time and money was much greater. In the end, HUD decided to keep this
group of households on the site and adjusted the plan accordingly. In the final master
plan, the size of Van Quan was reduced to 62 hectares, reflecting the exclusion of the
existing residential land from the project area. Hence, HUD modified the project's size to
accommodate the complex reality of site clearance.
Figure 7: Master plan of Van Quan project
Cultivatin2 relationshiP with local government
Contrary to the general perception of local government being cash-strapped,
desperate for investment projects and entrepreneurial, the town of Ha Dong didn't
demand any benefit from the developer or negotiate with the developer to grant it
approval for investment in Van Quan in exchange for public good provision. Van Quan
was designated for new urban area development in the city's master plan and HUD was
already appointed to be the developer of this new urban area by the city government. Due
to the project's size and scope, the town government had little influence over the project,
and development exactions did not occur. My interview with the officials of Ha Dong
town also revealed that developer wasn't required to pay for public good provision or
contribute to the commune budget. Ha Dong People's Committee was eager to have
HUD develop Van Quan as it was the first large new urban area in the province and it
would transform the local economy and speed up the urbanization process in this peri-
urban town. Yet, the developer not only provided infrastructure for the project but also
funded the construction of roads in the vicinity surrounding the project as well as
construction of sewers and schools. In addition, HUD paid the district 5 thousand VND
per square meter, extracted 60 billion VND from their profit to contribute to the town's
budget, and also made additional donations in cases of natural calamities (such as
flooding). Mr. H. said that HUD had to do this to nurture the relationship between the
developer and the commune for future projects. "It was also HUD's responsibility as a
good developer to give back to the locality". But it is also obvious that the opening of
roads leading to the project area would no doubt increase the value of the houses within
the project, so it was in the developer's self-interest to fund the construction of these
roads. Moreover, the local government also found it beneficial to support the developer
because the project was important for local economic development. Therefore, a mutual
beneficial relationship existed between the developer and the local government
Collaborating closely with local officials
The developer emphasized the role of local government, particularly the ward
level officials in making site clearance successful. Mr. T, the head of the site clearance
team said that "it made a whole lot of difference to have the assistance of ward officials
who had good relationship with local residents and was trusted by them". The developer
involved the ward officials in almost every step of the site clearance process. It needed to
tap into these officials' detailed knowledge of their locality to estimate the number of
affected households, their occupation, and their land parcels. It also asked local officials
to communicate with the residents about the project, the site clearance plan and schedule
for relocation. But most importantly, it invited local officials to participate in
compensation negotiations. Local officials were responsible for educating residents about
the soundness of government's policy and making them understand that their
subordination of private land interest is important the local economic development. They
also informed residents of the proposed compensation (including payment for land and
various other supports from the developer). Local officials that had good credibility and
were popular leaders among the village population were extremely effective in
persuading residents to agree to the terms of compensation.
Providing additional monetary incentives and support
HUD offered cash incentives in the amount of 1 million VND for households who
moved out according to the schedule in the compensation plan. HUD also provided 4.8
million VND per person for job training and this amount was transferred to the
agricultural collectives in the two affected wards. These collectives were responsible for
providing job training that is most appropriate with the market demand and the education
level of the labor force. A staff at HUD said that training courses on masonry, carpenter,
electronic repair, and tailoring were typically offered. The developer also promised to
hire 300 laborers from these communes to work on the project construction, management
or maintenance. In order to be eligible, the laborers needed to be members of households
whose land was requisitioned for the project, had the relevant skills and were in good
health conditions. One member of the site clearance team estimated that after the project
was completed, about 200 laborers from the village have been employed to work in
positions such as office guards and sanitation workers. HUD also closely coordinated
with ward authorities to find out the most sensible compensation arrangement for each
affected household. In some cases, HUD even provided capital for households to start
small business. Mr T. said that with this sentimental and reasonable policy, the
acquisition of land in this project proceeded smoothly.
Ensuring maximum transparency in process
The site clearance team said from their experiences, many complaints arose as
residents felt uninformed of the site clearance plan and left-out in the decision-making
process. Therefore, in conducting site clearance for Van Quan, they published the project
plan and compensation plan publicly at the ward's office and also distributed a copy to
each household. In every step of the site clearance process, they held meetings and
always invited members of the affected households to attend. The head of site clearance
team complained that "the number of meetings was definitely more than desired".
Moreover, a well-known difficulty with assembling land parcels from multiple owners is
that the last ones to sell can negotiate higher prices than the initial sellers, but when the
previous sellers find out about the new higher sales prices, they often want to renegotiate
the sale they already made. HUD therefore purposefully avoided striking private deals
with any individual households, but only applied the price and monetary support listed in
the compensation plan. According to the interviewees, strictly following guidelines in
official regulations would be "the best way to avoid any potential disputes from the
residents".
IV. Conclusion
This chapter provides a detailed account of the process of land acquisition for the
Van Quan new urban area project. Although this process is greatly facilitated by
favorable institutional conditions, such as effective local land management and flexible
local regulations, demand for better compensation and job resettlement was notably
explicit during site clearance negotiations, resulting in multiple hold-out cases. One
strategy that HUD used to deal with defiant households is to bring in popular local
leaders who had good personal relationship with these households. Other strategies
include altering the project plan, providing monetary incentives for early move-outs,
supporting job training programs, supplying capital for farmers to start small business,
and ensuring the participation of farmers in the site clearance planning process.
The above findings demonstrate that while being a state-owned enterprise means
that HUD might be able to use the state ownership to its advantage in other steps of the
land and housing development process, to successfully conduct land acquisition, HUD
would have to make concessions and adopt measures that would alleviate farmers'
grievances to be able to move its projects forward.
CHAPTER 5
Explaining HUD's success in land acquisition
I. Overview of Hypothesis
It has been shown in chapter 3 that the process of land acquisition for the Van
Quan project contradicts the reality of site clearance. HUD was able to complete
acquiring 62 hectares of land within 6 months, while experience showed that assembling
land for large-scale projects would take at least a few years because the process involved
negotiating with a larger number of land owners, and thus, the chance of site clearance
impasse and hold-outs would be significantly greater. So why did Van Quan have such a
speedy land acquisition process, despite its scale and complexity? Two hypotheses can
potentially explain this anomalous outcome, and will be discussed in the next section.
1. Strong state power
Although Vietnam officially abandons neo-Stalinist socialism, there has been
little change in the way the political power is structured. The state retains the one party-
state apparatus and has tremendous coercive power. It strictly prohibits and effectively
suppresses any questioning of Party rule or assembling to challenge Party or state
authority. Civil society is virtually non-existent as the Party won't tolerate any grass roots
movements other than those linked to the state organs. The politics of authoritarian rule
necessitates extensive state intervention in the economy and society. In the urban sector,
the state constrains the supply of all developable land through ownership annexation,
land use planning and the administration of development approvals, and therefore dictates
where developers could do project as well as project scale (Kim, 2008). The state also
structures a top-down institutional framework in which decision-making is not
transparent and information about specific developable sites is often unavailable. Thus,
any private firms interested in starting real estate projects in Vietnam would have to
develop political connections to navigate through the maze of government bureaus which
control access to land development rights. Only through political connections and social
networks can firms gain privileged access to land and expedited approval of projects.
Particularly, in the North of Vietnam, land supply and development is overwhelmingly
dominated by political elites and state-owned enterprises. There is also a rigid
bureaucracy with political interests to strictly conform to rules and a more law-binding
culture (Kim, 2007).
In this context, the sheer fact that Van Quan is a state-led project conducted by a
state-owned developer in the North of Vietnam leads to an obvious hypothesis that the
efficiency in land acquisition for Van Quan was merely because of strong power. After
all, the project is part of a major state-initiated housing development effort to address the
explosive housing demand triggered by economic growth and rural migration and the
current density in the urban core areas. In both the land use plan and the detailed plan
approved by the government of Hanoi and Ha Dong, the land where Van Quan is located
is designated for the development of a new urban area. Therefore, when handling site
clearance, HUD could easily invoke the "public purpose" claim to justify the acquisition
of land for Van Quan and pressure the farmers to accept the terms of compensation and
relocate.
In addition, being a state-owned real estate firm, HUD is imbued with great power
and legitimacy. HUD, along with other state-owned developers, is often appointed by city
governments to undertake large-scale real estate development projects. These companies
therefore control a large portion of the land designated for residential development in the
city's master plan. For example, of 44,000 hectares of land in the urban periphery,
RESCO, a city-owned Southern developer, developed 237 projects on 4,382 hectares of
land between 1994 and 2000, and had development rights for 5000 more hectares (Kim,
2008). They are also favored and protected by the government, and have easy access to
planning information and loans from state banks (Dixon and Kilgour 2002,
Gainsborough, Vu 2002). Moreover, as state-owned developers are the business arms of
city or national public agencies, they have tight connections with the administrative
system and the police force. Obtaining permits and approvals is fairly simple for these
developers. In projects such as new urban area development, they can even bypass the
ward and district authorities to work directly with the city government (JBIC, 1999).
They also have the power and incentive to strictly enforce the state-regulated
compensation rates, because if farmers disagree with the proposed compensation and
refuse to move out, the developers can bring in the police force to evict them from the
project site.
Studies of land acquisition in transition countries have shown that in state
projects, the residents have much less room for exercising their bargaining power because
the government can and will resort to coercive measures to deal with intransigent farmers
who refuse to voluntarily yield land. It is rare that state-owned developers would have the
discretionary budget and incentive, like private developers to adjust compensation
upward. Han and Vu (2008) investigated two case studies of land acquisition in Hanoi
and found that in both cases, the government stepped in and ordered eviction when the
developer failed to negotiate compensation deals with a number of current land
occupants. In the first case, the project is a mixed development targeting high-end living
by a private developer. But instead of directly handling land acquisition, this developer
contracted all site clearance tasks to SUDICO, a state-owned construction company
because it believed that with SUDICO's political connections and reputation, land
acquisition could be handled more effectively. SUDICO indeed successfully convince
70% of the affected households to move out voluntarily. However, the remaining 30% of
households was evicted with the use of the police force. In the second case, the
government approved the acquisition of 93 hectares of farmland in Tho Da village, Dong
Anh district of Hanoi for constructing a foreign-funded golf course. In a desperate
attempt to hamper the project, the villagers set up barricades to prevent entry of the
developer and construction workers. They even used weapons to attack the security and
construction workers. The police was called in to suppress the riot and arrest the
violators.
Guo (2001)'s analysis of the land expropriation for establishing a development
zone in China reveals that local government enforced land expropriation through the use
of strong measures. Local officials entered the village late at night, banging on doors and
forcing the reluctant households to accept compensation payments. During the day, the
officials roved around in utility vehicles in the fields destroying crops. Villagers who
defied the acquisition order were detained for "obstructing government administrative
work". The government sent in bulldozers to level the ground when the fields were still
not vacated by the given date and used water hoses to dissolve farmers' protests. The
suppression by the local government was clearly a terrifying experience for the villagers.
The evidences cited above demonstrate the rocky relationship between agents of
the state and the displaced residents in compulsory acquisition cases. The government
can engage in predatory actions to enforce official policies, even though this may cause
widespread public resentment. Thus, the success of HUD in acquiring land in a
short amount of time for the Van Quan project can be attributed to the presence of
effective state intervention, which not only helps legitimize land expropriation, but also
stifle resistance from recalcitrant farmers.
2. Profit-Driven Developer
While it is plausible to assume that being a state-owned enterprise implementing a
project that is deemed important for the city's development gave HUD substantial
leverage in land acquisition, it is also possible that in order to effectively conduct site
clearance and avoid project delays, instead of relying on state intervention to deal with
site clearance problems, HUD comes up its own strategies to overcome difficulties during
this process. A number of studies have shown that the reform of state-owned enterprises
in Vietnam has made them more independent from the government in decision-making.
They are increasingly acting as private entities rather than agents of the government
(Pham, 1995, Gainsborough 2002, Vu, 2002). Therefore, even though HUD is supported
by the state, as a for-profit entity established to capture the enormous profits from the
booming real estate market, it still has to find practical ways to quickly resolve any
conflicts or disputes from farmers to expedite the land acquisition process. Thus, in
assembling land for Van Quan, HUD might find itself having to mediate between its
desire to adhere to government regulations and farmers' demand for better compensation.
Moreover, the concerns about reputation and future business may also make HUD less
inclined to use coercive measures because this is an extremely costly option, and one that
will surely increase the public outrage against the developer and fuel more social
conflicts.
A study of private developers in Ho Chi Minh City by Kim (2008) shows that
these firms cope with impasse in compensation negotiations in a number of different
ways. Some offer more compensation to the residents, others reduce the project size if
enough of the project site has been secured, or offer developed land parcels as a form of
compensation to the farmers. However, they all adopt a common strategy, which is
actively using the help of government representatives, social institutions and non-state
actors in order to complete the negotiations.
If economic reforms have changed the way state-owned enterprises conduct
business and make them respond to market incentives and behave similar to private
developers, it can then be hypothesized that HUD would adopt a variety of measures to
address farmers' grievances and prompt them to voluntarily move out from the site,
rather than calling upon the state's strong power to accomplish land acquisition.
II. Empirical Findings
If the first hypothesis holds true, it is expected that state-owned developers would
generally be very efficient in site clearance because they have a state mandate to conduct
projects, a greater public claim to justify compulsory land acquisition, and strong ties to
various government bureaus and the police force to enforce the official compensation
rates. In state projects, it is unlikely that the displaced residents will be able to
influence the compensation outcome because the state can intervene at the developer's
request to command the use of force against resistance. However, as I have pointed out in
the previous chapters, like private projects, state projects are also filled with problems
related to compensation and resettlement. Many are stalled for years as a result of
impasse in compensation negotiations and disputes from residents. Key informants note
that requisitioning land for public work projects, such as roads, bridges, schools etc. has
met with increasing opposition, even though these projects deliver genuine public
benefits. Land acquisition for commercial and residential development projects is
therefore even more challenging because the purpose of the taking can hardly be justified
as serving the public interest. Moreover, the state-owned developers tend to be bounded
by official polices and have a small discretionary budget; they do not have the flexibility
to tamper with compensation levels like private developers. Most importantly, legal
reform has reduced the role of the state in land acquisition. The state has retreated from
being directly involved in acquiring land for non publicly-funded projects and put the
developers in charge of all site clearance tasks. This suggests that the success of HUD in
assembling land for Van Quan cannot simply be explained by the reliance on strong state
power. The success story may turn out to be more nuanced.
In fact, during my fieldwork, I found out that there was no incidence of protests or
riots against Van Quan's site clearance process. According to the officials of Ha Dong
town whom I interviewed, very few petitions were lodged against the developer and they
frequently came from households who were considered ineligible for compensation
because they lacked proofs of land ownership. Eviction didn't occur since all residents
voluntarily agreed to accept the cash compensation and yield land to the developer. Yet,
the discontent with compensation level and post-land acquisition livelihoods were very
much still at the center of farmer's grievances, driving many households to resist giving
up land contracts to press for more compensation. These actions, however, did not
escalate into public protests or massive petitions at the higher government bureaus
because the developer had promptly adopted various strategies, such as resizing the
project or increasing compensation, to pacify farmers and forge a sense of security and
justice that make farmers feel more at ease with giving up their land.
The analysis of the Van Quan case shows that the project's speedy land
acquisition process was not a result of the developer strong-arming the displaced farmers,
but rather of the developer yielding more to their demand. Why would HUD go the extra
mile to ensure that the farmers agree to voluntarily relocate out of the site instead of
engaging in predatory actions, which is often the case in authoritarian regimes where the
state has the hegemonic power to quell farmers' resistance? I propose two hypotheses
that can possibly explain the relatively benevolent behavior of HUD. First, the prevailing
real estate market at the time of Van Quan's development was so heated that any delay in
implementing the project meant huge potential profits forgone for both the developer and
the farmers. Second, contrary to the image of a strong socialist state imposing top-down
command and control, the state in Vietnam is an institution that is penetrated by wider
social forces and is rather sensitive to local demands and protests. This unique
relationship between the state and the society allows acts of resistance by farmers to
gradually increase farmers' bargaining power in the land acquisition process, and change
the way business is conducted by the developer. The following section will subsequently
elaborate each of these hypotheses, drawing evidences from my fieldwork and the
literature on housing and state and society relations in Vietnam.
III. The Real Estate Market
Vietnam's Doi Moi policy of 1986 to open up the economy to market principles
has been followed by subsequent reforms in the land and housing sector. The 1993 Land
Law instituted land use rights and allowed them to be transferred, exchanged, inherited,
and leased privately. Land has thus become a commodity to be traded in the market as
well as an asset for producing economic wealth. With this introduction of private
property rights into the economy, a booming real estate market quickly emerged.
Prices for land started skyrocketing in the early 1990s. Soaring land prices means
that huge fortunes could be made. In the absence of alternative investment vehicles,
individuals frantically channeled their savings into buying properties in hope that they
could later resell them at much higher prices and earn huge profits. Thus, in the 1990s,
Vietnam witnessed an explosion of property fever and widespread speculation in the real
estate market.
Given the prospect for enormous profits in such a heated property market, starting
from the late 1990s, large state-owned real estate companies have begun to get involved
in the production new residential spaces. Securing land use rights is critical for these
developers because land is the factor of production that fundamentally drives the level of
profit. If land could be purchased cheaply and then flipped back to the market in the form
of serviced land parcels or finished housing units, the developers could potentially realize
and capture huge financial gains (Kim, 2008). Hence, all developers were desperate to
find land that was still at the beginning of the rapid appreciation curve for implementing
land and housing development projects. A large number of new, mostly up-scale
residential living quarters have been erected in the periphery of major cities on land that
is previously designated for agricultural use. The developers purposefully choose to
locate projects in these areas because the cost of obtaining agricultural land use rights is
much lower, and larger parcels are available and more easily consolidated as
compensation negotiations involve fewer households.
Fueling developers' demand for land is consumers' demand for housing.
Although there has been a significant increase in the housing stock in Vietnam, driven by
the blossoming of Western-style suburbs and apartment blocks, the housing shortage
remains significant and is projected to become more severe especially in urban areas. The
squeeze is driven by rapid urbanization and economic growth, which significantly
increase formal employment in urban areas and migration activities. Moreover,
tremendous personal income growth creates the upper and middle class who are willing
and able to pay extraordinarily high prices for upscale housing. These forces combined
with changing expectations among younger Vietnamese to buy and live in their own
homes instead of living with their parents have increased pressure on housing,
particularly in the large cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, and skew housing
development towards servicing the more affluent market segment (FMO, 2008).
The high demand for housing is readily discernible in the real estate market.
Many residential projects sell out before the developers finish construction. Hanoi now
has 84 completed or nearly-completed apartment projects which are 100 per cent sold out
and another 10 projects being marketed (Savills, 2008). But the number of apartments
available in the primary and secondary market is still predicted to be insufficient to meet
medium to long-term demand. At one point, investors were queuing overnight to buy
condominium units, with prices of good-quality projects hitting $3,500 per square meter.
House prices doubled in 12 months, nearly tripled in some cases in 18 months
(globalpropertyguide.com).
A brief snapshot of rising house prices is displayed in Figure 6. The graph
demonstrates a clear pattern of overall growth of average housing sales price. The
average house price per square meter rose more than 300% between 2001 and 2008.
At the time of Van Quan's development in 2003, there was a rapid surge in
housing price. The average price was around $300 per square meter in 2001 and in 2003,
abruptly spiked to $600 per square meter. As a for-profit company, HUD was certainly
interested in capturing this potentially huge financial boon generated from the speculative
housing market. The Van Quan was also the first large residential development in Ha
Tay province, making the project an even more profitable investment. Any delay in the
project's progress was then financially costly. Hence, as housing demand was exerting
upward pressure on land and housing price, HUD found it advantageous to yield within
reasonable bounds to the demands of farmers to induce them to move off the land.
Moreover, the staff at HUD also noted that using coercive measures would surely
increase the public outrage against the developer and fuel more social conflicts. This
would not only further decelerate the progress of site clearance, but also negatively
impact HUD's reputation and threaten future business opportunities in the locality.
While the real estate market certainly affected HUD's behavior, farmers too
would be induced to change their attitudes. Since only agricultural land was acquired and
farmers could still keep their residential dwellings in the nearby village, the development
of Van Quan would drastically increase the property value in adjacent areas, creating
strong incentives for farmers to yield land to the developer to realize the project.
Figure 6: Apartments sold and average housing price, 2001-2008
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Yet, even when real estate prices are quickly trailing upward, it is also evident
that some state-owned developers have locked down site development options and don't
build anything for years, mainly because they lack sufficient capital to start projects. For
example, between 1994 and 2000, RESCO controlled 5000 hectares of developable land
in the periphery of Ho Chi Minh City, but only 1,664 hectares had projects planned for
them. These proposed projects required 3.45 trillion VND (roughly $238 million USD) in
capital, but the company only had a net profit of 61 billion VND in 2000 (Kim, 2008).
However, the case of Van Quan is different because this is a planned development by the
city authority and HUD was appointed to conduct the project. In addition to its own
capital, HUD could mobilize capital from other sources, such as the state budget, loans
from state bank, and future customers. It was also in HUD's interest to start the project
immediately to revolve capital for use in other projects.
IV. State and Society Relation
While responding to pressures from the real estate market is certainly one
plausible hypothesis for HUD's benevolent actions during the site clearance process,
another factor that might also impact the developer's behavior is the nature of state-
society relationship in Vietnam.
1. Theories on state-society relation in Vietnam
There is a strong presumption that the one party state in Vietnam is strong and
dominates every levels of society. Despite the move to inculcate market forces to
accelerate economic development, no serious steps have been taken to change the
Communist Party's lock on power. In this authoritarian regime, it is a well-known fact
that the state is capable of suppressing political opposition, monitoring the population as
well as controlling many aspects of the economy. In addition, official party ideology
demands a monopoly of the formal processes of political mobilization, representation and
decision-making. Moreover, there is a predisposition towards technocratic modes of
policy-making, with a plethora of research institutes and well-trained economic experts
feeding advices to top policy making circles (Painter, 2005).
However, scholars take issue with this image of a strong state overshadowing
society as an accurate characterization of the state-society relationship in Vietnam and
point out the reality that party-state policies often get stalled and even succumbed to
changes and reversals by societal responses. Society has a maneuvering space to do
things differently from the state's norms, and perhaps even influence the upper levels of
state authorities in changing those norms to suit practices in society. Scholars like
Beresford (1989) and Yip and Tran (2008) reckon that the Vietnamese state lacks the
institutional and administrative capacity of a "dominating state" to implement policies at
the local level. Policy "umimplementability" is a chronic problem, especially when the
country is governed through a highly decentralized and fragmented set of state
institutions. Multiple accounts of unauthorized activities that fall outside of official
channels in a number of key socio-economic policy areas such as urbanization, housing,
and public finance are vivid proofs of this viewpoint. For example, large-scale unplanned
urbanization took place in northern Vietnam during the Vietnam War despite state
policies of population control that strictly regulated internal migration as well as private
housing construction in the cities (Thrift and Forbes, 1986). Similarly, after the
reunification in 1975, Hanoi's residents frequently breached the state's policy in the
housing areas (Koh, 2000). From 1975 to 1990, recorded illegal construction cases in
Hanoi amounted to ten thousands. Gainsborough examines the politics of economic
liberalization in Ho Chi Minh City and finds that the key driver of growth lies in the
greater involvement in business by state institutions and officials. The lack of public
finance and low salaries paid to civil servants has caused different city departments and
state-owned enterprises to turn to other sources for revenue. They have created joint-
ventures with foreign companies, shareholding or limited liability companies, and have
sold their services as private consultants. In some cases, they even siphoned off state
assets into private companies (Gainsborough, 2002).
Some scholars go one step further to argue that social forces in Vietnam can on
certain occasions influence the practice of state institutions. State agencies could well
have tried to enforce their rules strictly, but partly forced by circumstances, and partly
because they want to continue enjoying mass support, they may choose to meet citizens
half-way in some situations. Fforde and Vylder (1996) assert that a noticeable feature of
Vietnam's reform process is "fence breaking", by which local actors frequently break the
rules, and such actions create appreciable bottom-up pressures that motivate the central
state to initiate economic reforms. Similarly, Koh (2006) sees the state-society relations
as being marked by tolerance, responsive and mutual influence. Even though the state
dominates society in some fundamental ways, lower levels of the state machinery, of
which the ward is a part, does not necessarily work as prescribed by higher levels. Local
officials can stand on the side of residents rather than the side of higher up authorities and
make the state more accommodating to people at that level without challenging the
structural dominance of the party-state. The result is a considerable amount of mediation
occurring at the local level to deal with the problematic aspects of policies. In the area of
urban housing for example, Koh (2004) argues that the appalling number of illegal
construction cases and inability of the central state to curb its growth in the 1990s was
exactly because local officials who were responsible for enforcing central policies did not
base their interaction with people only on laws and rules of the state. The impractical
rules coupled with complicated license application procedures gave people no choice but
to violate construction rules to improve their housing conditions. The ward officials,
driven by the moral concerns for the welfare of residents as well as personal economic
interests, ended up ignoring infraction and even legitimizing it in exchange for bribes.
Evidences shown above dispel the notion of a monolithic state able to have its
way on every issue. The dominance of the party state at the central level may allow it to
exclude society in decision-making and policy formulation, but society is usually able to
triumph in policy implementation at the local level. Instead of blind obedience, there has
been rather successful resistance by the population to undesirable central directives
thanks to the existence of a "mediation space" created by local officials as they struggle
to fulfill their dual role of being state agents and being part of the local community. Such
mediation not only allows societal forces to influence actions of bureaucrats at the ward
level, but sometimes this influence is channeled up and leads to in high-level policy
changes.
2. Linking theory to HUD's behavior
In order to provide land for urbanization and various economic development
activities, compulsory land acquisition has been used by the Vietnamese state at an
unprecedented scale. This process has delivered many positive impacts, such as
improving fiscal conditions for local governments, promoting industrial and economic
development, and allowing rapid expansion of urban areas. Yet, it has also negatively
impacted the economic and social well-being of the rural poor, the very population that is
forcibly displaced in the name of development. Facing the continual loss of farm land,
meager compensation and lack of alternative employment, the displaced have often
become vulnerable economically and disintegrated socially. The disenchantment with this
unequal share of the benefits and costs of land acquisition has triggered massive societal
responses. Since the early 1990s, there has been a marked upsurge in public protests and
petitions related to site clearance as the public began to perceive and contest the injustices
associated with land conversion processes. At the project level, the displaced have
frequently engaged in acts of resistance such as foot-dragging and holding out during site
clearance to hold up projects and demand more compensation.
The analysis of state-society relation in Vietnam in the previous section has
demonstrated that rather than being dominating and overpowering, the state is rather
accommodating to societal forces. In such a regime, I argue that farmers' resistance has
gradually influenced the conduct of the state and its agents and shaped outcomes of land
acquisition. There are plenty of evidences documenting that farmers have, over time,
gained increasing bargaining power in the land acquisition process. In terms of official
policies, the state instituted landmark legal change in 2004 to adjust the compensation
regulation in favor of displaced residents, in response to increasing social unrest over
land acquisition controversies in the 1990s. Before 2004, land acquisition was governed
by Decree 22/ND-CP issued in 1998, which required the district government to set up the
Council of site clearance and compensation to implement site clearance tasks and
compensate individuals whose land is requisitioned. However, Decree 197/ND-CP of
2004 only allowed publicly-funded or foreign-funded projects to qualify for the
establishment of such council, and delegated all site clearance tasks for commercial and
residential projects to the local developers.
This major change in policy has fundamentally changed the way developers
conduct business. In the beginning of transition, the firms had the upper hand in the
compensation negotiations because if the project had been approved by the city or district
authorities, the local government would be directly handling all site clearance tasks on
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the developer's behalf, although the funding for compensation would come from the
developer's budget. Farmers were therefore effectively pressured into accepting the
compensation land price regulated by the state, which was much lower than the market
price. However, since Decree 197 becomes effective, implementing site clearance
requires the developers to negotiate compensation with the residents on the basis of the
government price framework without the active help of the district government.
Moreover, other regulations require that firms first secure land use rights for about 80%
of the project site before they can receive approval for land subdivision plan (Kim, 2008).
With the new regulations, individual farmers have the ability to reject compensation and
hold up projects, much to the chagrin of the developers. But the government sees this as a
way to allow farmers to share in the gains from urban development. As the developers no
longer receive the state's assistance, they would have to figure out on their own how to
handle site clearance in the most efficient manner to avoid stalled compensation
negotiations. Consequently, some private developers have increased the compensation to
the level comparable to market price while others have offered developed land units in
the project site as a form of compensation. In the case of Van Quan, as a state-owned
developer, HUD didn't have the liberty to disregard the state-regulated land prices, so
instead, it increased the level of monetary support to displaced households. It also built
connection with the local government by contributing to the district government budget
and leveraged this connection in land compensation negotiations.
Another evidence for the increased power of farmers in land acquisition process is
the state's growing tolerance for oppositional social discourse on land acquisition
controversies. Public protests over land conversion issues have emerged in many cities
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and provinces of Vietnam. In one case investigated by Kim (2008), the protestors camped
out on the sidewalk in front of the city government hall in downtown to express their
grievances. Major newspapers also began to publish articles about land disputes starting
from the late 90s. These articles focus on criticizing the district and ward officials and
even the city government and their abusive use of power in handling compensation and
land-related matters (Kim 2008).
In sum, the literature on state-society relations in Vietnam reveals that even
though the one party state is the sole determinant of what kinds of rules enter the regime,
and frequently makes these rules without consulting the public, society still manages to
resist and evade state control and influence state actions. Therefore, unlike similar
incidents in some cities in China, in which resistance against land acquisition has been
brutally suppressed by the state, widespread public discontent with this process has
carried enough legitimacy to induce changes in the legal system and opening up of public
discourse on the issue. It is still true that if the developers and the farmers fail to agree on
compensation, by law, the state could still force farmers to yield land. But in such an
accommodating regime, the state is more tolerant of resistance and the use of force to
evict residents is much less common.
The fact that HUD did not resort to coercive measures during the process of land
acquisition for Van Quan but chose to yield more to citizens' demand can be explained
by this unique nature of state-society relation in Vietnam. Interviews with HUD officials
also confirm that even though HUD could have asked the state to intervene and use force
to evict the hold-outs, this option is only realistically available for public works projects;
and even in these cases, the process of implementation is extremely complex and time-
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consuming. There is also a sort of moral/cultural dynamics that motivate HUD to be more
lenient towards displaced farmers. The head of the resettlement team used to be a farmer
himself, he sympathized with what farmers had to go through. He also expressed
concerns about the livelihoods of farmers after they lost agricultural land. He strongly
believed that if the state didn't come up with a comprehensive plan for job training and
job resettlement, and effectively manage the land conversion process, land acquisition
would continue to cause harm to the lives of many farmers and fuel even greater social
unrest.
IV. Conclusion
In the last chapter, I have demonstrated that the success of HUD in acquiring land
for the Van Quan project in a short amount of time is not because of the use of strong
force, as one would expect from state-owned developer, but of a variety of measures that
was adopted by HUD to reduce the project site area, improve the compensation package,
build relationship with the local government, and raise farmers' awareness. In this
chapter, I put forth two hypotheses to explain why HUD necessarily adopted these
measures to accommodate farmers' demand, even when it could have coerced them to
yield land. First, as a for-profit entity, HUD wouldn't want the project to be held up for
too long because the heated property market significantly drove up the opportunity cost
of project delay. Second, the nature of state-society relation in Vietnam is such that the
acts of resistance by farmers have gradually changed the conduct of the state and the
developers, allowing farmers to gain increased negotiation power in land acquisition
process, and making it much harder to use force to facilitate site clearance.
103
However, it is also important to note that the police force has been involved in
clearing land for a number of state projects, where farmers appeared to be extremely
intransigent. Hence, in explaining the success of HUD, we have to take into account
factors unique to the project that have greatly facilitated site clearance for Van Quan,
such as the overall understanding attitude of farmers, the effective land management
practice which reduces the number of illegal construction and land dispute cases, and the
strong support from the local government for the project, given that this is the first new
urban area in Ha Tay province.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis investigates the phenomenon of compulsory land acquisition in
Vietnam, an important and highly contentious issue in Vietnam's current transition
process. Since the introduction of economic reforms in 1986, Vietnam has been growing
at a spectacular speed and urbanizing at an unprecedented scale. Rapid economic and
urban growth has significantly boosted the demand for urban services such as
employment space, housing and urban infrastructure and sharpened the competition over
urban land. In response to the increasingly scare land supply, the government has used
the mechanism of compulsory acquisition to convert massive amount of rural land in the
peri-urban areas to urban land for non-agricultural uses. A large number of the country's
poorest, most vulnerable citizens have been forced out of their land to make way for
development projects and have no option but to rebuild their lives, incomes, and asset
bases elsewhere. Yet, they are also the group that have least benefited from these
development interventions. Popular protests, sometimes violent, have arisen to voice
grievances and contest the social and economic injustices associated with recent land
conversion processes. This push back from society has, on the one hand, allowed farmers
to gain additional bargaining power in site clearance negotiations, but on the hand,
significantly delayed or halted many commercial and residential development projects.
With increased power, farmers can now reject the proposed compensation and hold on to
their land use rights, bringing the process of site clearance to an impasse. Thus, it usually
takes a long time for developers to complete assembling land for large development
projects.
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Given that site clearance usually experiences delays, the extremely rapid land
acquisition process for the Van Quan new urban area by HUD, Vietnam's largest state-
owned developer, seems rather anomalous. The analysis of the site clearance dynamics of
the project reveals that HUD was able to complete land acquisition within a short amount
of time because it directly addressed farmers' complaints through various means, such as
increasing support for job resettlement, employing state actors to help handling
compensation negotiation, ensuring a transparent and democratic site clearance process,
and even altering the project plan if it became too difficult to acquire all parcels. Why
would a state developer accommodate farmers' demand, when it could have easily forced
farmers to give up their land? The literature on state-society helps illuminate this
seemingly peculiar behavior of HUD. Despite the image of a unified and strong party
state able to control the economy and society, scholars have posited that the Vietnamese
state is fairly accommodating towards societal forces. In such regime, the state and its
agents changed the way they approached and implemented land acquisition in response to
growing resistance from farmers. HUD could no longer rely on state power as it often did
at the beginning of transition, and had to come up with more practical strategies to spur
farmers' voluntary action, because in doing otherwise, it would risk delaying the projects
even further, deepen the social conflicts, and potentially undermine the legitimacy of the
state and the developer. Moreover, the real estate market was booming rapidly at the time
of Van Quan's development. As a for-profit developer, HUD had strong financial
incentives to avoid any project delays to realize the huge potential profits that the project
could bring in such a favorable market.
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In addition to the strategies adopted by HUD, the site clearance process for Van
Quan was also aided by a number of structural conditions. Firstly, since the project site
was situated primarily on agricultural land used for cultivation purpose, conflicts around
resettlement issues were effectively eliminated because farmers still had their existing
homes in the village. Besides, the fact that they still lived nearby also incented them to
support the project development because the project would induce rapid appreciation in
land and house value in the locality, allowing them to capture huge windfall gains.
Secondly, the majority of agricultural landholders possessed land use certificates, making
it relatively easy for the developer to determine comparable compensation for each
household. The efficient local land management practices helped reduce the number of
illegal land transfers and construction cases and minimize complaints around these issues.
Thirdly, the official regulation guiding the process of compulsory acquisition in Ha Tay
province had not yet been fully developed. HUD could then be more flexible with the
level of compensation and support for the displaced. Fourthly, since the project began in
late 2002, the process of site clearance was still structured by Decree 22 which required
local government engagement, HUD received support from the city and district
government not only in approving the proposed site clearance plan, but also in actively
helping with handling compensation negotiations. The local government also
enthusiastically assisted HUD because Van Quan was the first large-scale urban housing
development project in the province. Lastly, the project is located at a great distance from
the city core in an agricultural area where land value was still really cheap at the time of
development and the income of land owners was far below the urban income level. This
condition also aided the process of negotiating compensation.
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Several broad policy implications can be drawn from this case. First,
compensation and livelihoods remained the main causes of farmers' resistance during site
clearance. This indicates that in order for site clearance to proceed efficiently in the
future, the government should continue adjusting regulations so that the level of
compensation can match the prevailing market rate. But more important, the government
should issue comprehensive job resettlement policy to help farmers gain new skill sets so
that they can become successful urban workers and transition better to urban lifestyles.
Cash compensation to farmers represents a crucial element of the compensation package
for Van Quan since only agricultural land was requisitioned. However, if projects involve
the taking of residential land, controversies over resettlement could have risen and
obstruct site clearance implementation. The government should then ensure that
resettlement housing is ready before site clearance begins so that the displaced can
relocate to the new areas and settle their lives quickly. The case of Van quan also shows
the importance of institutional factors such as land titling and local land management in
making site clearance successful. The process of granting land use certificates to urban
land should therefore be pushed further. Apart from these official policies, the process of
site clearance should also be made transparent and democratic to ensure that farmers'
interests are taken into account in the decision-making process. Farmers should be
notified about land acquisition plans and policies, so that they feel that their rights are
respected. The government should also improve the legal process to make lower levels of
bureaus more responsible with resolving disputes from farmers.
Compulsory land acquisition is considered an inevitable corollary of
modernization and industrialization. Yet, this process has resulted in increasing social
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tension and socio-economic injustices that may impose long term threat to the stability
and sustainability of urban development. Since a growth environment imposing
inequitable burdens is not a recipe for long-term economic success, the government needs
to pay greater, more focused and unremitting attention to resolve issues and challenges
that arise from compulsory land acquisition. By failing to foster urbanization through
such strategy, the Vietnamese Communist Party - a Leninist party that still officially
commits itself to the socialist ideals of egalitarianism will find itself politically vulnerable
in the society it rules.
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